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THE PROBLEM OF PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY-
WILL CONGRESS EVER SOLVE IT?
JOHN D. FEERICK*
O NE of the most critical and intriguing constitutional questions ever
presented for solution is: What happens when the President of the
United States becomes incapable of discharging the powers and duties
of his office? Does the Vice-President "become President" for the re-
mainder of the term or does he merely "act as President" during the
period of the inability? The Constitution is not explicit. It provides:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall de-
volve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accord-
ingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.'
The words "the Same" can be interpreted as referring either to "the
Powers and Duties" or to the "Office." If it is the office which devolves,
presumably the Vice-President becomes President, while if it is the
powers and duties, he merely acts as President. And it would seem clear
from the wording of the clause that. whatever devolves on the Vice-
President does so whether the case be one of removal, death, resignation
or inability.
Article II, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution created no problems
for more than fifty years after its passage.2 The latent ambiguity in the
* Member, New York Bar. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance
of his wife.
1. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. (Emphasis added.)
2. Pursuant to its power to appoint a successor where both President and Vice-President
are immobilized, Congress enacted a law of March 1, 1792, placing the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, respectively, next in line.
1 Stat. 240. The act was objectionable because it allowed for a period during which no
one would be available to act as President, as during a recess of Congress when there is no
President pro tempore of the Senate or Speaker of the House. This possibility existed when
Vice-President Arthur succeeded President Garfield. No one would have been available to
succeed Arthur if he in turn had died before Congress convened. Another objection to the
succession law was that the President pro tempore or Speaker might be from a different
political party than the President and would be in a position to change the membership of
the Cabinet. Thus, on January 19, 1886, the order of succession was changed so that the
Vice-President would be followed, in turn, by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Treasury, the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, the Postmaster General, the Secretary
of Navy, and the Secretary of Interior. 24 Stat. 1 (1886). By an Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343,
§ 201, 61 Stat. 499, the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force were merged
into the National Military Establishment, overseen by the Secretary of Defense. While
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clause did not manifest itself until the death of President William Henry
Harrison on April 4, 1841, only one month after his inauguration. Despite
protests about the constitutionality of his action, Vice-President John
Tyler asserted his right to the office and became President for the
remainder of Harrison's term. His succession to the title and full au-
thority of the Presidency, and not merely to the powers and duties of
the office, was followed, in turn, by Vice-Presidents Millard Fillmore,'
Andrew Johnson,4 Chester A. Arthur,' Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin
Coolidge7 and Harry S. Truman.'
The Tyler precedent has not been extended beyond cases of death.
Resignation9 and removal' situations have never arisen. The same is
this new governmental agency did not become an executive department (Department
of Defense) until the Act of August 10, 1949, ch. 412, § 4, 63 Stat. 579, its Secretary was
added to the line of succession on July 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 509, a new line having been
established by an Act of July 18, 1947, ch. 264, 61 Stat. 380. This act reinstated the Speaker
of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, respectively, before the heads of
the executive departments. This was done in order to insure that the immediate successors
after the Vice-President are elected officers, even though they may be from a different political
party than the President. The new order of succession among department heads is:
State, Treasury, Defense, Attorney General, Postmaster General, Interior, Agriculture,
Commerce and Labor. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1958).
3. Succeeded President Zachary Taylor upon his death on July 9, 1850. He took the
oath of office on the following day.
4. Succeeded President Abraham Lincoln upon his death on April 15, 1865, and took
the oath of office on the same day.
5. Succeeded President James A. Garfield upon his death on September 19, 1881. He
took the oath of office on the following day.
6. Succeeded President William McKinley upon his death on September 14, 1901, and
took the oath of office on the same day. See Andrews, The Autobiography of Theodore
Roosevelt 192-93 (1958 ed.).
7. Succeeded President William G. Harding upon his death on August 2, 1923. He took
the oath of office on the following day before his father, a state magistrate and notary
public. In order to insure the validity of his oath, which was questioned, Coolidge again
took the oath-before Judge A. A. Hoehling of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia. Magruder & Claire, The Constitution 156 & n.1 (1933). See generally Daugherty,
The Inside Story of the Harding Tragedy 278-80 (1932); Fuess, Calvin Coolidge 315
(1940).
8. Succeeded President Franklin D. Roosevelt upon his death on April 12, 1945. He
took the oath of office on the same day.
9. 3 U.S.C. § 20 (1958) provides: "The only evidence of a refusal to accept, or of a
resignation of the office of President or Vice President, shall be an instrument in writing,
declaring the same, and subscribed by the person refusing to accept or resigning, as the case
may be, and delivered into the office of the Secretary of State." Only one Vice-President
has resigned from office. John C. Calhoun, who was Vice-President under Presidents John
Quincy Adams (1824-1828) and Andrew Jackson (1828-1832), resigned in 1832 to run for
the Senate and his resignation was transmitted to the Secretary of State as required by the
Act of March 1, 1792.
10. President Andrew Johnson, however, was impeached by the House of Representa-
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not true of presidential inability. On two occasions, when a President
was unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office," the Vice-
President did not assume them for fear that by virtue of the Tyler prece-
dent the Constitution would make him President for the remainder of
the term without regard to the cessation of the inability. As a result,
during these periods in our history the effective functioning of the
executive branch was impaired and the Nation suffered. When illness
befell President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1955, 1956, and again in 1957,
all the uncertainty of the past surrounding the inability clause was
revived. In an effort to avoid an interregnum, President Eisenhower and
Vice-President Richard M. Nixon reached an understanding in MNIarch
of 1958 under which the Vice-President would act as President during
periods of presidential inability.12 Shortly thereafter, the Eisenhower-
Nixon precedent was followed by President John F. Kennedy and Vice-
President Lyndon B. Johnson. 3 This type of arrangement, however, has
not solved the problem created by the Tyler precedent: Should the Vice-
President permanently replace the President in cases of inability?
tives on February 24, 1868, by a vote of 126 to 47. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1400
(1868). He was then tried before Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase in the Senate and
acquitted by only one vote (35 voted guilty and 19 not guilty). Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.,
2d Sess. 411-15 (Supp. 1867). It is interesting to note that at the beginning of the impeach-
ment episode, some members of the House were concerned whether Johnson, who had suc-
ceeded Lincoln, had assumed the office or was merely acting as President. Cong. Globe, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 319-21 (1868). The House impeached him as President. See generally Stryker,
Andrew Johnson: A Study in Courage (1929).
11. See pp. 90-120 infra. This does not take into account the period that intervened
between the shooting of President McKinley on September 6, 1901, and his death on
September 14, 1901. See Leech, In the Days of McKinley 595-603 (1959). Nor does it take
into account the week before President Harding's death. See S. Adams, Incredible Era: The
Life and Times of Warren Gamaliel Harding 373-89 (1939); W. Johnson, The Life of
Warren G. Harding 233-37 (1923). See generally J. Kane, Facts About the Presidents
(1959); U.S. News & World Rep., March 9, 1956, p. 50 ("Presidents and Their Health").
12. White House Press Release, March 3, 1958. See notes 210-11 infra and accompanying
text; see also President Eisenhower's remarks at his news conference of February 26, 1958,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1958, at 188-89 (U.S. Gov't Printing
Office, 1959). At a news conference on April 3, 1957, President Eisenhower stated: "Now,
the Vice President, as we see it under the present wording of the Constitution, . .. himself
has to decide . . . [the existence of inability]. But he has always been reluctant to do it
because he says, 'How would he turn it back at the end?' or 'Do I become President for the
whole time or am I Acting President or am I really the President?' And it is astonishing
how full our records are of contrary opinions on this." Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States, 1957, at 245 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1958).
13. White House Press Release, August 10, 1961. See notes 213-14 infra and accompany-
ing text; see also President Kennedy's remarks at his news conference of August 10, 1961,




Further, the arrangement does not have the force of law and has no
binding effect if one or both of the parties should decide to break it.
And, finally, it does not extend beyond the term of the parties involved.
The problem has other important and intriguing facets: What is
"inability"? Who initiates the question of whether "inability" has oc-
curred and who resolves the issue when it has been raised? Who decides
when the "inability" has ended once it is found to exist?
Former Presidents and Vice-Presidents, committees of Congress, Con-
gressmen, Attorneys General, bar committees, experts on constitutional
law, lawyers, professors, historians, and others have offered a number
of suggestions.' 4 Activity and interest concerning the problem reached a
peak during the period surrounding the Eisenhower illnesses. It was then
carefully and thoroughly examined. However, due to a tremendous vari-
ance in opinion among those who studied the problem, no solution was
ever agreed upon by Congress.
The problem of presidential inability has now been generally for-
gotten by our national legislators as well as by the public. Since we have
a young, able and healthy President," all indications are that the issue
will remain dormant until another inability crisis confronts the country.
Yet it is imperative that Congress act now. In view of past and present
confusion regarding the problem, a presidential inability during a time
of crisis could be fatal. The country can no longer afford the uncertainty
that exists. The time demands that the effective working of the execu-
tive branch be insured. As Representative Emanuel Celler of New
York so well stated: "Our position of world leadership demands that
we avoid the terrible crisis that would result if a vacuum existed in the
office of the President for even a short period of time."'1 "Failure to
14. See generally Comm. on Fed. Legislation of N.Y.C.B.A., The Problem of Presi-
dential Inability, 17 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 185 (1962); Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (hereinafter cited as 1958 Senate Hearings); Hearing Before
the Special Subcommittee on Study of Presidential Inability of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) (hereinafter cited as 1957 House Hearing);
Hearings Before Special Subcommittee to Study Presidential Inability of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (hereinafter cited as 1956 House
Hearings); House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Presidential Inability:
An Analysis of Replies to a Questionnaire and Testimony at a Hearing on Presidential
Inability (Comm. Print 1957) (hereinafter cited as 1957 Analysis); 42 Ops. Att'y Gen.
No. 5 (1961). And see the recent Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963)
(hereinafter cited as 1963 Senate Hearings).
15. It is reported that President Kennedy has missed only two days from official duties
because of illness. U.S. News & World Rep., June 10, 1963, p. 16 ("The President at 46").
16. 19 F.R.D. 153, 157 (1956) (speech at St. Paul, Minnesota).
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act," as Representative Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr. of New Jersey put it,
"could imperil the future freedom of our Nation and, as a consequence,
that of the world. 1 7
The purpose of this article is to re-examine the problem in detail"-
in particular, to explore the events prior to and during the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, to recount the interesting history of presidential in-
ability, to examine the succession provisions of state and foreign constitu-
tions, and finally to discuss the proposed solutions. The article ends with
that solution which is, in the opinion of the author, the least objectionable
and the most consistent with the principles underlying our form of
government.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787
D A. Pre-Convention Practice
Article II, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution had its origin in the
early grants, 9 royal charters and colonial practice. The office of
deputy or lieutenant governor existed in almost all the colonies2 1 and
17. 1956 House Hearings 19. See U.S. News & World Rep., June 15, 1956, p. 71
("A Vice President Must Take the Initiative as Acting President").
18. The outstanding treatise on the subject is Silva, Presidential Succession (1951). See
also Brownell, Presidential Disability: The Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 68 Yale
L.J. 189 (1958); Gasperini, The Presidential Inability Riddle, 31 N.Y.S. B. Bull. 258
(1959); Hansen, One Strike and You're Out-The Constitution and Executive Disability,
5 N.H. Bar. J. 5 (1962); Hansen, Executive Disability: A Void in State and Federal Law,
40 Neb. L. Rev. 697 (1961); Heinlein, The Problem of Presidential Inability, 25 U. Cinc. L.
Rev. 310 (1956); Silva, Presidential Inability, 35 U. Det. L.J. 139 (1957); Symposium-
Presidential Inability, 133 No. Am. Rev. 417 (1881); Wickersham, Presidential Inability:
Procrastination, Apathy and the Constitution, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 262 (1961-1962). For a good
bibliography, see 12 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 462-63 (1957), and for an excellent analysis
of the subject, see Davis, Inability of the President, S. Doc. No. 308, 65th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1918). Published at this writing is Hansen, The Year We Had No President (1962). For
general, but excellent studies on the Vice-Presidency, see Hatch & Shoup, A History of the
Vice Presidency of the United States (1934); Levin, Seven by Chance: The Accidental
Presidents (1948); Waugh, Second Consul (1956); Williams, The American Vice Presi-
dency: New Look (1954); Williams, The Rise of the Vice Presidency (1956); Burns, A
New Look at the Vice Presidency, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1955, § 6 (Magazine), p. 11.
19. Most of the English colonies in America were started by grants to private individuals
or trading companies. Private ownership gave way to royal charters and royal provinces.
Every colony except Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Delaware became a
royal province, administered under a royal commission by a Governor who was appointed
directly by the King. Maryland was ruled by the Crown only from 1689 to 1715. The gov-
ernments in these five colonies were, in the main, not unlike the others. See Jernegan, The
American Colonies, 1492-1750 (1959 ed.); Labaree, Royal Government in America (1930).
20. Provisions for a deputy or lieutenant governor are found in many of the early
charters, wherein hereditary succession was common. The author's source for the early
1963]
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it was not at all uncommon for this official to act as Governor in case of
the absence from the colony, sickness, death or other inability of the
Governor.21 In the English-governed colonies, where the Governor was
the local representative of the Crown as well as the chief executive of
the colony, the office of lieutenant governor was part of the govern-
mental machinery. The lieutenant governor usually served pursuant
to a King's commission 22 which authorized him to perform the powers
of the Governor in cases of need.
As the colonies moved toward unity, the subject of executive succession
was never overlooked. Thus, the Albany Plan of Union of 1754 provided
that:
[I]n case of the Death of the President General the Speaker of the Grand Council
for the time being shall succeed and be vested with the same gowers and authorities
& continue till the Kings [sic] pleasure be known.2 3
The state constitutions which came into existence shortly after the
Declaration of Independence reveal a certain pattern of thinking
regarding executive succession*.2  The first constitutions of North Caro-
charters is Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charter, and Other Or-
ganic Laws of the United States (2d ed. 1878) (hereinafter cited as Poore). For some of
these provisions, see The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (1669) (2 Poore 1403);
Conn. Charter of 1662 (1 Poore 253); Mass. Bay Charter of 1629 (1 Poore 936-37); Mass.
Bay Charter of 1691 (1 Poore 948); Grant to William Penn of 1681 (2 Poore 1516); R.I.
and Providence Plantations Charter of 1663 (2 Poore 1597),.
21. See generally, Labaree, op. cit. supra note 19, at 127-28. The author states that no
less than 40 colonial Governors died in office, that some were recalled for disobedience or
inefficiency, and that others resigned because of health. Id. at 125-26. In one case a Gov-
ernor's failing health necessitated a commission to a lieutenant governor to act In his place.
Id. at 19 & n.35. In August, 1716, Governor John Hart of Maryland, who was in IIl
health, expressed concern about what would happen to the administration of government
should he take sick or die. His concern resulted in an act providing for the transfer of power
to the first person named in the Crown's commission, which person would act until the
Governor returned or another was appointed.
22. The lieutenant governor's commission is explained in Labaree, op. cit. supra note 19,
at 19-21. Sometimes a lieutenant governor would not be commissioned until an emergency
had arisen. See, e.g., 1 Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia 43 (1925)
(hereinafter cited as Executive Journals). At times, when there was no lieutenant governor
in the colony, the senior member of the Governor's council would act as Governor. Id. at
494, 500; 3 id. at 119 (1928); cf. 5 id. at 345-46 (1945) ; see Laws of the Government of New
Castle, Kent and Sussex 102-03 (Franklin & Hall 1752 ed.); It was not unusual for
the Governor to appoint a successor to act during his absence from the colony. See, e.g.,
5 Executive Journals 20 (1945).
23. Newbold, The Albany Congress and Plan of Union of 1754, at 187, 189, 192 (1955).
24. For background material, see Dodd, The First State Constitutional Conventions, 1776-
1783, 2 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 545 (1908); F. Green, Constitutional Development in the South
Atlantic States, 1776-1860 (1930); E. Greene, The Provincial Governor in the English
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lina,25 Delaware-' and Virginia2 7 provided for a temporary successor to
the chief executive upon the occurrence of such contingencies as death,
absence and inability. The constitutions of Pennsylvania -  and New
Jersey"9 provided for a temporary successor in cases of absence; Mary-
land,30 in cases of death, resignation and removal from the state;
New York,31 in cases of death, resignation, absence from the state,
Colonies of North America (1898); Kelly & Harbison, The American Constitution, Its Origins
and Development 1-114 (1955); Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolu-
tion, 1775-1789 (1924); Sanders, Evolution of Executive Departments of the Continental
Congress, 1774-1789 (1935); Solberg, The Federal Convention and the Formation of the
Union of the American States (1958); Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789
(1922); B. Wright, The Early History of Written Constitutions in America, in Essays in
History and Political Theory in Honor of C. H. McIlwain (1936); E. Wright, Fabric of
Freedom, 1763-1800 (1961).
25. N.C. Const. art. XIX (1776) (2 Poore 1412-13) provided: "And on his [the Gov-
ernor's] death, inability, or absence from the State, the Speaker of the Senate for the time
being-(and in case of his death, inability, or absence from the State, the Speaker of the
House ...) shall exercise the powers of government, after such death, or during such
absence or inability ... or until a new nomination is made by the General Assembly."
26. Del. Const. art. 7 (1776) (1 Poore 274) provided: "And on . . . (the President's]
death, inability, or absence from the State, the speaker of the legislative council for the
time being shall be vice-president, and in case of his death, inability, or absence from the
State, the speaker of the house ... shall have the powers of a president, until a new
nomination is made by the general assembly."
27. Va. Const. (1776) (2 Poore 1911) provided: "A Privy Council ...shall annually
choose, out of their own members, a President, who, in case of death, inability, or absence
of the Governor from the government, shall act as Lieutenant-Governor."
28. Pa. Const. § 20 (1776) (2 Poore 1545) provided: "The president, and in his absence
the vice president, with the council, ... shall have power .... "
29. N.J. Const. art. VIII (1776) (2 Poore 1312) provided: "That the Governor, or, in
his absence, the Vice-President of the Council, shall have the supreme executive power ......
30. Md. Const. art. XXXII (1776) (1 Poore 825) provided: "That upon the death,
resignation, or removal out of this State, of the Governor, the first named of the Council,
for the time being, shall act as Governor, and qualify in the same manner; and shall
immediately call a meeting of the General Assembly, giving not less than fourteen days'
notice of the meeting, at which meeting, a Governor shall be appointed, in manner afore-
said, for the residue of the year"
31. N.Y. Const. art. XX (1777) (2 Poore 1336) provided: "And in case of the
impeachment of the governor, or his removal from office, death, resignation, or absence
from the State, the lieutenant-governot shall exercise all the power and authority apper-
taining to the office of governor until another be chosen, or the governor absent or
impeached shall return or be acquitted. . . " Several authorities state that the office of
Vice-President bore a striking resemblance to the office of lieutenant governor of New
York, also an elective office. See, e.g., J. Robinson, The Original and Derived Features
of the Constitution of the United States of America (1890). See also 1 Bryce, The
American Commonwealth 686 (1910); Stevens, Sources of the Constitution of the United
States: Considered in Relation to Colonial and English History 81 (1894); The Federalist
No. 68, at 350-51 (Beloff ed. 1948) (Hamilton).
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impeachment and removal from office; New Hampshire 2 and Massa-
chusetts,33 in cases of death, absence from the state and otherwise;
and Georgia,34 in cases of absence or sickness. The Rhode Island 0
and Connecticut36 charters, which were still in effect, provided for a
deputy governor to act in the absence of the Governor by occasion of
sickness, or otherwise by his leave and permission. The South Carolina
constitution was unique in its provision that in the event of the "im-
peachment of the governor . . . or his removal from office, death, resig-
nation, or absence from the State, the lieutenant-governor shall succeed
to his office . . .
At the time of the Convention, therefore, in all the state constitutions,
with the possible exception of South Carolina's, succession provisions were
worded so that the succeeding officer would not assume the office of the
chief executive but merely his powers and duties for a limited tenure.
Logic dictates the conclusion that this practice influenced the thinking
of the delegates when they addressed themselves to the subject of presi-
dential succession. The fifty-five men who attended the Convention
during the summer of 1787 were the leaders of the colonies. 8 They were
32. N.H. Const. (1784) (2 Poore 1289) provided: "WHENEVER the chair of the
president shall be vacant, by reason of his death, absence from the state, or otherwise, tile
senior senator for the time being, shall, during such vacancy, have and exercise all the
powers and authorities which by this constitution the president is vested with when
personally present." Compare N.H. Const. (1776) (2 Poore 1280).
33. Mass. Const. ch. II, § 2, art. III (1780) (1 Poore 967) provided: "Whenever the
chair of the governor shall be vacant, by reason of his death, or absence from the com-
monwealth, or otherwise, the lieutenant-governor, for the time being, shall, during such
vacancy, perform all the duties incumbent upon the governor, and shall have and exercise
all the powers and authorities which, by this constitution, the governor is vested with,
when personally present."
34. Ga. Const. art. XXIX (1777) (1 Poore 381) provided: "The president of the
executive council, in the absence or sickness of the governor, shall exercise all the powers
of the governor."
35. R.I. and Providence Plantations Charter of 1663 (2 Poore 1598).
36. Conn. Charter of 1662 (1 Poore 253).
37. S.C. Const. art. VIII (1778) (2 Poore 1621). (Emphasis added.) Accord, S.C. Const.
XIV (1776) (2 Poore 1618-19). However, article 10 of the Constitution of 1778 (2 Poore
1622) provided: "[I]n case of the absence from the seat of government or sickness of the
governor and lieutenant-governor, any one of the privy council may be empowered by
the governor, under his hand and seal, to act in his room ... "
38. Summaries of the lives of these men are to be found in Appleton, Cyclopaedla of
America Biography (rev. ed. Wilson & Fiske 1900); Dictionary of American Biography
(1936). For an interesting and novel view as to the kind of men they were, see Beard,
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1960). See 3 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 87-97 (Farrand ed. 1911 & 1937) (Yale
University Press) (hereinafter cited as Farrand); Solberg, The Federal Convention and the
Formation of the Union of the American States 387-406 (1958).
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undoubtedly familiar with their state constitutions, for many had taken
part in drafting them. An overwhelming majority had served in their
state legislatures, and many had served in the Continental Congress.
And thirty-six were lawyers.39
In framing the Constitution, the Founding Fathers did not indulge in
the prolixity of a legal code but, to a large extent, in generalities that
expressed a certain philosophy of government. Executive succession was
part of that philosophy. How it became a part of the Constitution is an
interesting chapter in our history.40
B. The Convention
Although the Convention opened on May 25, 1787, it was not until
May 29 that a plan for a federal government was introduced. On that
day, Edmund Randolph of Virginia read the fifteen resolutions of his
state's plan, one of which called for a national executive to be appointed
by Congress.4 ' The plan contained no succession provision. The Con-
vention then voted to resolve itself, the day following, into a Committee
of the Whole and to refer the plan to the Committee."
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina then presented his plan to the
39. The author's study, drawn from the sources in note 38 supra, shows the following
lawyers:
Connecticut: Oliver Ellsworth, William S. Johnson and Roger Sherman.
Delaware: Richard Bassett, Gunning Bedford, Jr., George Read and John Dickinson.
Georgia: Abraham Baldwin, William Few and William Houstoun.
Maryland: Luther Martin and John F. Mercer.
Massachusetts: Rufus King and Caleb Strong.
New Hampshire: None.
New Jersey: David Brearley, Jonathan Dayton, William C. Houston, William Livingston
and William Paterson.
New York: Alexander Hamilton, John Lansing and Robert Yates.
North Carolina: NWilliam R. Davie and Alexander Martin.
Pennsylvania: Jared Ingersoll, Gouverneur Morris, James Wlson and George Clymer.
Rhode Island: Not represented at Convention.
South Carolina: Charles C. Pinckney, Charles Pinckney and John Rutledge.
Virginia: John Blair, James Madison, George Mason (not licensed but an expert on
matters of public law), Edmund Randolph and George Wythe.
40. The most scholarly work on the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention is a
three volume work by Farrand, op. cit. supra note 38. See also Bancroft, History of the
Formation of the Constitution of the United States of America (1885); Farrand, The
Framing of the Constitution of the United States (1962 ed.) ; Prescott, Drafting the Federal
Constitution (1941). For an interesting narrative account, see C. Van Doren, The Great
Rehearsal: The Story of the Making and Ratifying of the Constitution of the United
States (1948).
41. 1 Farrand 16, 20, 24, 27.
42. Id. at 16, 23, 24.
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Convention,43 and it was immediately referred to the Committee of the
Whole. Although it is generally believed that Pinckney's was the first
plan to contain a succession provision,44 there is impressive evidence that
it had none at all.4 5
On June 15, the Paterson Resolutions (or New Jersey Plan) were
submitted to the Convention, calling for a plural executive.40 There
was no mention of succession. Three days later Alexander Hamilton of
New York gave a brief sketch of his plan of government, which included
this provision:
On the death resignation or removal of the Governour his authorities to be exercised
by the President of the Senate till a Successor be appointed.
47
During the next five weeks the Constitution began to unfold as the
delegates thoroughly examined the Virginia and New Jersey Plans. In
the main, attention was directed to the proposals for a federal legislature.
On July 23, a Committee of Detail was formed and given the responsi-
bility of considering the matters that had been discussed in the Conven-
43. Ibid.
44. See, e.g., 42 Ops. Att'y Gen. No. 5, at 3-4 (1961); Davis, op. cit. supra note 18;
Silva, op. cit. supra note 18, at 4.
45. The evidence: In 1818, when John Quincy Adams was preparing the Journal of the
Convention, he could not find any copy of Pinckney's Plan among his papers, Consequently,
he wrote Pinckney and asked him for a copy of the original. Pinckney replied, sending a
draft which included the following succession provision: "In case of his [the President's]
removal death resignation or disability The President of the Senate shall exercise the
duties of his office until another President be chosen-& in case of the death of the President
of the Senate the Speaker of the House of Delegates, shall do so--" 3 Farrand at 588.
Several scholars have studied Pinckney's Plan and have reached the conclusion that the
draft of 1818 was not the same as the original plan. Becker, The Pinckney Plan for the
Federal Constitution (1911); Jameson, Studies in the History of the Federal Convention
of 1787, at 117-32; 1 Amer. Historical Ass'n, Ann. Rep. 87, 117-32 (1902). Both authors have
reconstructed the original plan, based on the views expressed by Pinckney during the Con-
vention and immediately thereafter, and, as reconstructed, the plan contains no provision
on executive succession. It is suggested by Jameson that the 1818 draft was nothing more
than a paraphrase of the draft of the Constitution presented to the Convention on August 6
by the Committee of Detail. Jameson, supra, at 124. See note 50 infra and accompanying
text. The above evidence is summarized in 3 Farrand at 601-04, and the reconstructed plan
is set out at 604-09.
46. 1 Farrand at 241-45.
47. Id. at 292. Hamilton's Plan was never formally discussed. As included in his written
draft, the succession clause read as follows: "The President of the Senate shall be vice
President of the United States. On the death, resignation, impeachment, removal from office,
or absence from the United States, of the President thereof, the Vice President shall exercise
all the powers by this Constitution vested in the President, until another shall be appointed,
or until he shall return within the United States, if his absence was with the Consent of
the Senate and Assembly." 3 Farrand at 625.
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tion up to the time 48 On July 24, the Committee of the Whole was dis-
charged and the various plans were referred to the Committee of Detail .4
On August 6, the committee presented a draft of the Constitution to
the Convention. Article X, section 2 of the draft provided:
In case of his [the President's] removal as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disability
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the President of the Senate shall
exercise those powers and duties, until another President of the United States be
chosen, or until the disability of the President be removed.40
The committee's draft was the subject of discussion for the rest of
the month. The succession section was not discussed until August 27,
when Hugh Williamson of North Carolina suggested "that the Legisla-
ture ought to have power to provide for occasional successors . ... 1
He then asked that further discussion of the question be postponed. John
Dickinson of Delaware seconded the motion for postponement, remark-
ing that Article X, section 2, was "too vague. What is the extent of the
term 'disability' & who is to be the judge of it?"5 2 His questions were
never answered. 3
On August 31, a number of matters, including succession, were referred
to a Committee of Eleven. 4 On September 4, it presented, through its
48. 2 Farrand at 85, 95. Its members were John Rutledge of South Carolina, Edmund
Randolph of Virginia, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, Oliver Elsworth of Connecticut,
and James Wilson of Pennsylvania. Id. at 97, 106.
49. Id. at 98, 106.
50. Id. at 186. (Emphasis added.) Professor Farrand has traced the following notes to
the Committee of Detail: (1) An emendation in the handwriting of John Rutledge (id. at
137 & n.6) that "the Presidt of ye Senate to succeed to the Executive in Case of (death)
Vacancy untill the Meeting of the Legisle. .. ." Id. at 146. (2) A note of James Wilson
(id. at 163 & n.17), containing this clause: "In Case of his Impeachment, (Dismission)
[Removal], Death, Resignation or Disability to discharge the Powers and Duties of his
(Department) [Office]; the President of the Senate shall exercise those Powers and Duties,
until another President of the United States be chosen, or until the President impeached or
disabled be acquitted, or his Disability be removed." Id. at 172. Professor Farrand says the
parts in parentheses were stricken out in the original and the bracketed words were added
by Wilson.
51. Id. at 427.
52. Ibid.
53. Professor William W. Crosskey of the University of Chicago Law School says the
reason for this was that on the same day the judiciary provisions were extended, meeting
"Dickinson's complaint completely." 1958 Senate Hearings 236. Overlooked by the Pro-
fessor, perhaps, is the fact that Dickinson's state, Delaware, and very likely Dickinson
himself, voted against the extension. 2 Farrand 428.
54. Id. at 473, 481. The members were Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, David Brearley of
New Jersey, Pierce Butler of South Carolina, Daniel M. Carroll of Maryland, John
Dickinson of Delaware, Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire, Rufus King of Massachusetts.
James Madison of Virginia, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, Roger Sherman of
Connecticut, and Hugh XVilliamson of North Carolina. New York wvas unrepresented.
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chairman, David Brearley, a partial report which recommended the
choice of the President by an electoral college and suggested, for the
first time in the Convention, an office of Vice-President:
[I]n case of his removal as aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or inability to dis-
charge the powers or duties of his office, the Vice-President shall exercise those
powers and duties until another President be chosen, or until the inability of the
President be removed 5
Thus, a Senate-elected President of the Senate was removed from the
succession provision. Committeeman Roger Sherman of Connecticut
commented that the office of Vice-President was introduced in order to
make the Executive independent of Congress."
During the sessions of September 5, 6 and 7, the delegates discussed
the report. The questions of succession and the office of the Vice-Presi-
dent were not reached until September 7. That session opened with
a motion by Edmund Randolph of Virginia to add the following clause
to the report:
"The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the U.S.-shall act as President
in case of the death, resignation, or disability of the President and Vice-President;
and such officer shall act accordingly vutil the time of electing a President shalt
arrive."5 7
James Madison of Virginia objected to the italicized part on the ground
that it would prevent the filling of a vacancy by a special election. Accord-
ingly, he moved to substitute the words "until such disability be removed,
or a President shall be elected." His motion prevailed by a vote of six to
four."' The delegates then addressed themselves to the Vice-President's
position as President of the Senate and its relation to the principle of
separation of powers.
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts declared: "We might as well put the
President himself at the head of the Legislature. The close intimacy that
55. Id. at 493, 495. (Emphasis added.) Until then, the President of the Senate, who
would be chosen from the Senate, was regarded as the immediate successor. The sole
exception was Hamilton's Plan, which provided for a Vice-President. See note 47 supra.
James McHenry of Maryland recorded in his notes for September 4 that there was "no
provision ... for a new election in case of the death or removal of the President."
Id. at 504. He apparently misunderstood the significance of the words "until another
President be chosen," as they would permit a special election. See text accompanying note
57 infra.
56. Id. at 499.
57. Id. at 535. (Emphasis added.)
58. Ibid. For: Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and




must subsist between the President & vice-president makes it absolutely
improper."59 Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania observed that
the vice-President then will be the first heir apparent that ever loved his father-If
there should be no vice president, the President of the Senate would be temporary
successor, which would amount to the same thing. 0°
In addition, Roger Sherman argued that
if the vice-President were not to be President of the Senate, he would be without
employment, and some member by being made President must be deprived of his
vote, unless when an equal division of votes might happen in the Senate, which would
be but seldom. 01
Edmund Randolph concurred in opposition to the clause providing for
Vice-President.62 Hugh Williamson said that "such an officer as Vice-
President was not wanted. He was introduced only for the sake of a
valuable mode of election which required two to be chosen at the same
time." 3 The question of succession was not further considered.
On the next day, a committee was formed "to revise the style of and
arrange the articles agreed to by the House."'" This Committee of Style
was given no power to effect substantive changes in the matters sub-
mitted to it.65
On September 12, the committee returned a draft to the Convention
which, except for a few changes, was to become the Constitution of the
United States.6" When the draft submitted to the committee is compared
with the draft returned to the Convention, it becomes evident that some
confusing changes were made in the provisions relating to presidential
succession. These provisions are compared below.
As Submitted: 7  As Returned:0s
Sec. 2: [I]n case of his removal as In case of the removal of the president
aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or from office, or of his death, resignation,
inability to discharge the powers or or inability to discharge the powers and
duties of his office the Vice President duties of the said office, the same shall
shall exercise those powers and duties devolve on the vice-president, and the
59. Id. at 536-37.




64. Id. at 547, 553.
65. It is interesting to note that all its members were lawyers-Alexander Hamilton,
Wiflliam S. Johnson, Rufus King, James Madison and Gouverneur Morris. Id. at 547, 554.
66. Id. at 590-603.
67. Id. at 575, 573. (Emphasis added.) The submitted provisions, it is to be noted, were
separated from each other.
68. Id. at 598-99. (Emphasis added.)
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until another President be chosen, or Congress may by law provide for the
until the inability of the President be case of removal, death, resignation or
removed, inability, both of the president and vice-
Sec. 1: The Legislature may declare by president, declaring what officer shall
law what officer of the United States then act as president, and such officer
shall act as President in case of the shall act accordingly, until the disability
death, resignation, or disability of the be removed, or the period for chusing
President and Vice President; and such another president arrive.
Officer shall act accordingly, until such
disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
Thus, in the process of "revising the style" and "arranging" two sepa-
rately positioned clauses were joined and the following changes were
made: (1) the term "inability" was substituted for "disability" and the
"absence" contingency was dropped; 69 (2) the words "the same shall de-
volve on the vice-president" were substituted for "the Vice-President
shall exercise those powers and duties"; (3) the clauses "until such disa-
bility be removed, or a President shall be elected," which had appeared,
in substance, after both the Vice-President and "other successor" clauses,
now appeared only after the latter as "until ... the period for chusing
another president arrive."
The substitution of the words, "until... the period for chusing another
president arrive" for those which had been agreed upon, namely, "until
... a President shall be elected," was probably the result of an oversight
on the part of the committee. Thus, on September 1570 the words that
had been agreed to on September 7, permitting a special election, were
reinserted and those that had been wrongly substituted were deleted.
As a result of the committee's changes, the meaning of the succession
clause to later generations was rendered uncertain. Did "the Same"
refer to the office? And was there any limitation on the tenure of the
Vice-President in cases of inability? Grammatically, the changes can be
harmonized with what had appeared in the prior drafts. "[T]he Same
shall devolve on the vice-president" is a clause the subject of which is
the pronoun "same," whose antecedent is the object of the verb "dis-
69. It is the author's opinion that "absence" was dropped because the Committee felt
that such was included within "inability" and that "inability" was intended to apply to
inability, whether temporary or permanent, and due to any cause. Samuel Johnson defined
"inability" as "impuissance; impotence; want of power" and "disability" as "want of power
to do anything; weakness; impotence; want of proper qualifications for any purpose; legal
impediment." Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed. 1783). "Disability"
can be considered more restrictive in the number of situations covered by it. The framers
of the Constitution, however, appear to have used the terms interchangeably. See note 196
infra for constitutions with an "absence" contingency.
70. 2 Farrand 626.
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charge," i.e., "powers and duties of the said office," not "office," which
is the object of the preposition "of." Further, the words of limitation,
"until the disability be removed," can apply not only to an officer ap-
pointed by Congress, but to the Vice-President as well, since the limita-
tion is separated from the first part of the sentence, not by a semi-colon,
but merely by a comma.71 Grammatical hair-splitting of this sort is, how-
ever, not necessary for an understanding of the succession provision."w
Clarity of meaning is provided not so much by a study of the grammar
involved as by a study of the intention of the framers.
There is no doubt that the delegates envisioned a temporary Acting
President in presidential-inability situations, as in cases of death, resigna-
tion or removal. They intended the Vice-President to discharge the powers
and duties of the office until the inability was removed or another Presi-
dent was elected, allowing for a special election. All the drafts before
the Committees of Detail and Style were explicit in this regard. More-
over, Madison, Hamilton and King were members of the Committee of
Style and were particularly notable for their advocacy of a strong, in-
dependent President. They would not have accepted a proposal under
which the Vice-President would succeed to the Presidency until the end
of the term, particularly in "inability" situations. It is clear that when
the Constitution left the Convention on September 17, the delegates
accepted "the same" as referring to "Powers and Duties" and the words
limiting tenure, i.e., "until the disability be removed, or a President shall
be elected," as applicable to all successors, including the Vice-President.
C. Other Evidence
Some support for this conclusion is to be found in the deliberations of
some of the state ratifying conventions.73 At times, the Vice-President
71. Some versions of the Constitution show vital semicolons. E.g., 1 Annals of Con-
gress xi (1789). However, the Constitution, as on file in the National Archives in Washing-
ton, D.C., and all official versions thereof (1 U.S.C. xlvii (1958)), do not have semicolons.
With semicolons, there obviously would be a good argument that the Constitution places
no limitation on the tenure of the Vice-President but only on the tenure of officers appointed
by Congress.
72. Other ponderables exist: In 1787, "devolve" was defined as "to fall in succession into
new hands" and "office" as "employment." Johnson, op. cit. supra note 69. Does one not
enter an office? Do not powers and duties fall? Professor Williams, however, says that "it
is a dichi of modem political science that 'an office passes, powers and duties devolve .... I"
Williams, op. cit. supra note 18, at 53. Another ponderable exists: If the Vice-President
permanently replaces the President, what happens in a situation where the ice-President
becomes disabled after the President and the President is the first to recover. Does the
officer appointed by Congress continue to act? Such a result was never intended.
73. See Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution (1876 ed.) (hereinafter cited as Elliot). See generally, Bates, Rhode
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was referred to as "Acting President."74 One delegate to the North
Carolina ratifying convention, however, remarked that "on the removal
of the President from office, it devolves on the Vice-President."7 An-
other delegate, in the Massachusetts Convention, referred to the Vice-
President when "acting as President" and then, curiously, stated that he
takes the presidential oath before entering the office of President."
In contrast, a proposed amendment at the New York Convention
spoke of "the President of the United States, or the person holding his
place for the time being .... ),77
The Federalist No. 68 contained this interesting language:
[T]he vice-president may occasionally become a substitute for the president, in
the supreme executive magistracy. . . . We [New York] have a lieutenant-governor,
chosen by the people at large, who presides in the senate, and is the constitutional
substitute for the governor in casualties similar to those, which would authorize the
vice-president to exercise the authorities, and discharge the duties of the president.78
Island and the Formation of the Union (1898); Grigsby, The History of the Virginia Fed-
eral Convention of 1788 (1890-1891); Harding, The Contest Over the Ratification of tho
Federal Constitution in the State of Massachusetts (1896); Libby, The Geographical
Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen States on the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788
(1894); McMaster & Stone, Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788 (1888);
Miner, The Ratification of the Federal Constitution by the State of New York (1921) ; Tren-
holme, The Ratification of the Federal Constitution in North Carolina (1932); Walker, A
History of the New Hampshire Convention for the Investigation, Discussion and Decision of
the Federal Constitution (1888).
74. 2 Elliot at 85.
75. 4 Elliot at 44.
76. 2 Elliot at 85.
77. 2 Elliot at 408.
78. The Federalist No. 68, at 350-51 (Beloff ed. 1948) (Hamilton), (Emphasis added.)
See Warren, The Making of the Constitution 635 (1937 ed.), whete the author says: "It is
singular that there was no discussion as to the chief part which the Vice President has, In
fact, played in history, that is, to his succession in case of the death of the President."
Professor Warren says that it was probably contemplated that the Vice-President would
merely perform until a new election. Ibid. Compare Curtis, 1 Constitutional History of
the United States 568-69 (1889 ed.) (suggests that office devolves), with Story, Com-
mentaries on the Constitution of the United States 527-28 (1833 ed.) (speaks of Vice-
President as succeeding to office if vacancy). For views of other textbook writers, see
Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 96-97 (1954) (powers and duties
devolve; temporarily, in cases of inability); Corwin & Peltason, Understanding the Con-
stitution 45 (1949) (powers and duties devolve); Guitteau, Government and Politics
in the United States 292 (1911) (office devolves in all cases); Long, Genesis of the Con-
stitution of the United States of America 186-87 (1926) (succeeds to office in cases of
vacancy); Mathews, The American Constitutional System 137 (1940 ed.) (an Acting
President was intended); Magruder & Claire, The Constitution 154-55 (1933) (duties
devolve; authors doubt the idea of permanent succession in cases of inability); Munro, The
Constitution of the United States 79 (1930) (framers intended powers and duties to
devolve); Norton, The Constitution of the United States; Its Sources and Its Application
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Other parts of the Constitution are also revealing. Article I, section 3,
clause 5, provides that the Senate shall choose a President pro tempore
"in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the ofice
of President of the United States."7" The twelfth amendment, effective
in 1804 at a time before any problems had arisen, provides that if the
House of Representatives does not elect a President by March 4, "then
the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or
other constitutional disability of the President."8 10 These parts indicate
early understanding of the effect of the succession clause. The twentieth
and twenty-second amendments, however, passed at a time when the
Tyler precedent was well established, may be viewed as giving recog-
nition to the precedent. The twentieth amendment provides that if the
President-elect dies before the time fixed for his term to begin, the Vice-
President-elect shall become President, but if the President-elect fails to
qualify, the Vice-President acts as President until he qualifies. The
twenty-second amendment refers to a person "who may be holding the
office of President when this Article was proposed .... ,,81
The state constitutions which came into existence shortly after the
United States Constitution, furnish additional evidence that succession to
108 (1922 ed.) (Constitution clearly says that Vice-President to discharge duties of office);
Ogg & Ray, Essentials of American Government 160-61 (1932 ed.), where the authors speak
of duties devolving as well as of the Vice-President assuming the Presidency, and imply
that the President would not be permanently replaced in cases of inability; Patterson, Am-
erican Government 243-44 (1929) (says that upon succession, the Vice-President becomes
'President, exercising powers of the President temporarily"); Sheppard, The Constitutional
Text-Book 169-70 (1855) (duties devolve; temporarily, in cases of inability); Sila, Presi-
dential Succession 13 (1951) (powers and duties devolve; temporarily, in cases of inability) ;
Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789, at 133 (1922) (succeeds to Presidency
when thefe is a vacancy); Young, The New American Government and Its Work 89 (1925)
(succeeds "the President in case of the latter's disability or death").
79. (Emphasis added.) At the time of the Convention, "exercise meant to practice; to
perform." Johnson, op. cit. supra note 69. It still does. Webster's New International Dic-
tionary of the English Language 892 (2d ed. 1957).
80. Notwithstanding the use of the word "act," a few members of the Eighth Congress
regarded any succession by the Vice-President as being for the rest of the President's term.
Silva, op. cit. supra note 78, at 35-37 & n.97. Such a view is not concerned with whether it
is the office or powers and duties that devolve because, in either case, the argument goes,
succession is for the rest of the term.
81. The twentieth amendment is the only place where the Constitution states that a
Vice-President "becomes" President-and that is on the occurrence of one specific con-
tingency. The twenty-second amendment was proposed in 1947, at a time when Truman
was President, due to the death of President Roosevelt. As a result, it has been argued that
the Constitution, by the use of the words "holding the office," now recognizes succession
to the office. Williams, The American Vice-Presidency: New Look 55 (1954). But see Kan.
Const. art. I, §§ 13-14, and Mont. Const. art. VII, §§ 14-15, where the expression "holding the
office" means nothing more than exercising the powers and duties of the office.
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the office was not what was intended by the Founding Fathers. Almost all
of the state constitutions written between 1788 and 1841 provided that
the successor to the Governor was to exercise the office or its powers and
duties for a limited tenure. 2 In cases of death, resignation or removal,
he was to act as Governor until another Governor assumed the office; in
cases of absence or impeachment, he was to act until the Governor
returned or was acquitted. Inability as a contingency was generally absent
from these constitutions.83 However, the principle of a temporary suc-
cessor was well established and undoubtedly would have been applied
to cases of inability as well.
II. HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
A. Tyler
The death of President William Henry Harrison, just thirty days after
his inauguration, gave rise to a precedent that has, in effect, assumed the
force of law. Immediately following his death on April 4, 1841, Vice-
President John Tyler, a Virginia Democrat who had split with his party
and had run with Harrison on the Whig ticket, journeyed to Washington
where, on April 6, he took the presidential oath of office before Chief
Judge William Cranch of the Circuit Court for the District of Colum-
bia.84 He became the tenth President of the United States, the first Vice-
82. See, e.g., Ala. Const. art. IV, § 18 (1819) (1 Poore 39); Ark. Const. art. V, § 18
(1836) (1 Poore 110); Conn. Const. art. IV, § 14 (1818) (1 Poore 262); Fla. Const. art.
III, § 18 (1838) (1 Poore 320); Ga. Const. art. II, § 4 (1789) (1 Poore 385); (cf. Ill. Const.
art. III, § 18 (1818) (1 Poore 443)); Ind Const. art. IV, § 17 (1816) (1 Poore 504-05);
Ky. Const. art. II, ff 15 (1792) (1 Poore 650) ; La. Const. art. III, § 17 (1812) (1 Poore
704); Me. Const. art. V, § 14 (1820) (1 Poore 795); Mich. Const. art. V, § 13 (1835)
(I Poore 987); Miss. Const. art. IV, § 20 (1817) (2 Poore 1061); Mo. Const. art. IV, § 16
(1820) (2 Poore 1110); N.H. Const. § 49 (1792) (2 Poore 1302); N.Y. Const. art. III,
§ 6 (1821) (2 Poore 1344); Ohio Const. art. II, § 12 (1802) (2 Poore 1458); Pa. Const.
art. II, § 14 (1790) (2 Poore 1551); Tenn. Const. art. II, § 12 (1796) (2 Poore 1670);
Vt. Const. § 11 (1793) (2 Poore 1878) ; Va. Const. art. IV, § 5 (1830) (2 Poore 1918). S.C.
Const. art. II, § 5 (1790) (2 Poore 1631), however, provided for succession to the office
of governor.
83. Interestingly, the Delaware Constitution of 1792, providing for the "exercise [of] the
office" in cases of inability, declared that no Governor could be removed from office on
account of inability without a two-thirds vote of all members of the legislature. Del. Const.
art. III, § 14 (1792) (1 Poore 282); same, Del. Const. art. III, § 14 (1831) (1 Poore 293).
84. Tyler wanted to have Mr. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney administer the oath, but
Taney was in Maryland at the time and it is said that he i¢efused to attend without a formal
request. See Silva, op. cit. supra note 78, at 16-17. It is also said that Tyler took the oath
of office because he regarded himself, without it, as merely an Acting President. Corwin,
The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1957, at 54 (1957) ; Warren, op. cit. supra note 78,
at 636 & n.2. Others say that Tyler, certain of his status as President, took the oath In
order to remove any doubt that might arise in the future. Fraser, Democracy in the Making
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President to succeed to the title and authority of the Presidency.s
Tyler's ascendancy to the office of President, and not merely to its
powers and duties, was not without opposition. Protests were echoed
by several newspapers of the day. 6 Some leaders of the Whig party
regarded him as an "Acting President," but Harrison's Cabinet appears
to have accepted him as President." It is interesting to note, however,
that when the Cabinet notified him of Harrison's death, he was addressed
as Vice-President. 8 Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, is said to
have been of the view that the powers and duties were inseparable from
the office and that any succession by a Vice-President was to the office for
the remainder of the term.89 John Quincy Adams, sixth President of the
United States, then a member of the House of Representatives, held a
different opinion. His diary of April 16, 1841, contained this notation:
158, 160 (1938) (The Jackson-Tyler Era); Williams, op. cit. supra note 81, at 52 & n.36. The
oath of office clause (U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8) has obvious reference to the elected
President. The words "h'e" and "his" make this dear. The Vice-President, who takes the
same oath as other public officials (see 15 Stat. 85 (1858), 5 U.S.C. § 16 (1958)), should not
have any greater authority by virtue of taking the presidential oath. Whatever devolves
on the Vice-President does so independently of the oath. The oath taken by the Vice-
President provides, in part, as follows: "I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of
the office on which I am about to enter." Succession is one of those duties. In any event,
the precedent of the Vice-President taking the presidential oath in cases of death is now
well established. See Horwill, The Usages of the American Constitution 70-71 (1925).
It is also to be noted that Tyler gave an inaugural address on April 9. 4 Richardson,
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, at 36-39 (1898). See Binkley, The Man
in the White House 268-71 (1959).
85. In his diary of April 4, 1841, John Quincy Adams reported that the Constitution
"makes the Vice-President of the United States, John Tyler, of Virginia, Acting President
of the Union for four years less one month." 10 Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams
456 (1876).
86. See Silva, op. cit. supra note 78, at 18-20.
87. The Cabinet consisted of George E. Badger, Secretary of Navy; John Bell, Secretary
of War; Thomas Ewing, Secretary of Treasury; John J. Crittenden, Attorney General;
Francis Granger, Postmaster General; and Daniel Webster, Secretary of State. After taking
the presidential oath in a Washington, D.C. hotel, Tyler held his first Cabinet meeting.
Fraser, op. cit. supra note 84, at 159. Daniel Webster is said to have suggested at the
meeting that all Cabinet matters be subject to a majority vote, whereupon Tyler said he
would have the ultimate say in all matters. Ibid. By September 11, 1841, the whole
Cabinet, with the exception of Daniel Webster, had resigned due to differences of opinion
over Tyler's banking policies. Webster stayed for two years in order to conclude the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty defining the disputed boundary between Maine and Canada.
See Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America 363
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1934).
88. Fraser, op. cit. supra note 84, at 151. Tyler's son viewed this as a mere oversight.
2 Tyler, Lyon, Letters and Times of the Tylers 72 (1885).
89. See Silva, op. cit. supra note 78, at 15-16 & n.8. See 13 Cong. Rec. 122 (1881) (re-
marks of Senator Charles W. Jones of Florida).
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But it [Tyler's assumption of the title and office of the Presidency] is a construction
in direct violation both of the grammar and context of the Constitution, which con-
fers upon the Vice-President, on the decease of the President, not the office, but
the powers and duties of the said office. 0o
When the Special Session of the Twenty-Seventh Congress met on
May 31, 1841, some of its members took strong exception to Tyler's
assumption of the presidential office. On that day, Henry A. Wise of
Virginia introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives calling
for the formation of a committee "to wait on the President of the United
States.... .""' Representative John McKeon of New York immediately
moved to strike the word "President" and insert "Vice-President, now
exercising the office of President." He argued that "a grave constitutional
question" was presented, which should be set "at rest for all future
time."92 The House rejected his suggestion and passed the Wise resolution
intact, forwarding it to the Senate, which discussed it the next day.
There, Senator William Allen of Ohio strongly urged that Tyler be
addressed as "the Vice President, on whom by the death of the late Presi-
dent, the powers and duties of the office of President have devolved.""5
Senator David Tappan of the same state agreed, saying that under the
Constitution a person could become President only through the elective
route and not by succession. Senator Robert J. Walker of Mississippi
disagreed. In his opinion, the Constitution provided for two separate
contingencies. He stated that the Vice-President succeeds to the office
because the Constitution was explicit that an officer appointed by Con-
gress acts as President where both President and Vice-President are
immobilized but not so where a Vice-President takes over for an im-
mobilized President. "This is the language and the meaning of the Con-
stitution," he said. "Can there be any doubt on the subject?"' 4 Senator
Allen thought there was. He hypothesized a case of temporary disability,
more easily conceived of by the Founding Fathers than death, he said,
where a disabled President recovered to find the Vice-President in his
office.
The question would then arise, which of the two officers should continue in the
chair .... Was it [the office] to vibrate [assuming a struggle for power] between
the two claimants? In what manner could a President of the United States-unim-
peached, sane, and alive-cease to be President? There was none known to the
Constitution. None. 95
90. 10 Adams, op. cit. supra note 85, at 463-64.
91. Cong. Globe, 27th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1841).
92. Id. at 3-4. Representative Wise remarked that Tyler would claim a right to the
title and office, so that Congress should address him accordingly.
93. Id. at 4.




Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina regarded the discussion as
being irrelevant since there was a permanent vacancy in the presidential
office. The House resolution passed the Senate, without change, by a vote
of thirty-eight to eight, and the Tyler precedent became firmly established
in our history.
B. Garfield
On July 2, 1881, President James A. Garfield was preparing to leave
Washington to attend a class reunion at Williams College when he was
shot by Charles T. Guiteau, a disappointed office seeker, who exclaimed,
"I am a Stalwart and Arthur is President now!"P9 President Garfield
was rendered unconscious, and hovered between life and death. Vice-
President Chester A. Arthur was notified that he should be ready to take
the oath of office "at any minute."97 He, and the Nation, were kept posted
by the doctors as to Garfield's condition. For the next eighty days, Gar-
field lay near death, although he was conscious for a good part of the
time. He was clearly unable to discharge the powers and duties of the
Presidency,98 and "the Federal Administration simply drifted."09 During
the disability his only governmental act was that of signing an extradition
paper. 00
Several weeks after the shooting the Cabinet met and unanimously
agreed that Vice-President Arthur should assume the responsibilities of
the Presidency. A majority of the Cabinet, however, including Attorney
General Wayne MacVeagh, held the view that Arthur's succession would
be to the Presidency and that Garfield would be unable to regain his
office should he recover.' Others held the same view. Abram J. Ditten-
hoeffer, a noted lawyer of the day, declared:
I start with this conclusion :-That whenever the Vice President gets lawfully into
the Presidency the President gets lawfully out of it. There cannot be two lawful
96. Lossing, A Biography of James A. Garfield 627-31 (1882), where the author discusses
the complexion of the Republican Party at the time. See Clancy, The Presidential Election
of 1880, at 262-67 (1958).
97. 2 Smith, The Life and Letters of James Abram Garfield 1179 (1925).
98. For good accounts of the period, see Binkley, op. ciL supra note 84, at 279-S0;
Bundy, The Life of James Abram Garfield 233-47 (1880); Lossing, op. cit. supra note 96,
at 628-65, 765-89; Ogilvie, History of the Attempted Assassination of James A. Garfield 29-99
(1881); Smith, op. cit. supra note 97, at 1179-1207; Silva, op. cit. supra note 78, at 52-57.
99. Howe, Chester A. Arthur, A Quarter-Century of Machine Politics 152 (1957 ed.). The
author says there were many public matters that required the President's attention. One such
matter was post office swindles. Id. at 153.
100. Id. at 152. During the eighty days, Secretary of State James G. Blaine displayed
some initiative, but he was criticized for it.
101. Brownell, Presidential Disability: The Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 68
Yale L.J. 189, 193 (1958).
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Presidents at the same time .... Mark, no limit to the time for which these powers and
duties "shall devolve" is fixed. It is just as absolute and limitless as if the language
were:--"In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, or
resignation or inability to discharge the powers and duties of said office, the Vice
President shall become President." . . . And when the President gets lawfully out
there is no way in which he can get in again. 10 2
Vice-President Arthur, who was from a different faction of the Repub-
lican Party, refused to act. He feared being labeled a usurper and, quite
possibly, killing Garfield."°3 The former fear was justified because
the people, having been kept up-to-date on Garfield's condition through-
out the summer months, were, so to speak, in Garfield's corner.
As one biographer of Garfield has said, "It may be doubted if at any time
in the history of the United States the human sympathies of the people
had been worked up to such a pitch of intensity.' 0 4
Garfield's losing fight against death ended on the evening of Septem-
ber 19, 1881. Arthur was informed of the death and took the presidential
oath of office before Justice John R. Brady of the New York Supreme
Court on September 20 at approximately 2:00 A.M. So that there would
be a federal record of it, he repeated the ceremony in Washington on
September 22 before Mr. Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite of the United
States Supreme Court.105 Thus, Arthur became the twenty-first Presi-
dent of the United States, the fourth by succession.
Due largely to his own experiences, Arthur expressed deep concern
over the question of presidential inability in his messages to Congress
in 1881, 1882, and again in 1883.10 His message of December 6, 1881,
contains as clear a statement of the problems involved as can be found
anywhere:
Is the inability limited in its nature to long-continued intellectual incapacity, or has
it a broader import? What must be its extent and duration? How must its existence
be established? Has the President whose inability is the subject of inquiry any
voice in determining whether or not it exists, or is the decision of that momentous
and delicate question confided to the Vice-President, or is it contemplated by the
Constitution that Congress should provide by law precisely what should constitute
inability, and how and by what tribunal or authority it should be ascertained? If the
inability proves to be temporary in its nature, and during its continuance the Vice-
President lawfully exercises the functions of the Executive, by what tenure does he
hold his office? Does he continue as President for the remainder of the four years'
102. N.Y. Herald, Sept. 13, 1881, p.5, cols. 1-2.
103. See Howe, op. cit. supra note 99, at 151-52. The author states that Postmaster General
Thomas L. James asked Arthur whether he would assume presidential power, but he
declined to do so. Id. at 153.
104. Smith, op. cit. supra note 97, at 1201.
105. Howe, op. cit. supra note 99, at 155.
106. 8 Richardson, op. cit. supra note 84, at 65, 147-48, 187.
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term? Or would the elected President, if his inability should cease in the interval,
be empowered to resume his office? And if, having such lawful authority, he should
exercise it, would the Vice-President be thereupon empowered to resume his powers
and duties as such?10
7
Garfield's death generated a great deal of discussion of the inability
problem. The November 1881 issue of the North American Review
carried a series of articles by four outstanding constitutional authorities.
In the symposium, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois,"" Governor
Benjamin F. Butler of Massachusetts"0 9 and Judge Thomas M. Cooley
of the Michigan Supreme Court" expressed the opinion that a Vice-
President merely "acts" as President for the period of inability. Professor
Theodore W. Dwight of Columbia College"' differed, subscribing to the
view that succession by the Vice-President was for the remainder of the
presidential term.
Similarly, there was discussion in the Forty-Seventh Congress. Senator
Charles W. Jones of Florida forcibly argued, as had Senator Robert J.
Walker of Mississippi in the Twenty-Seventh, that succession was to the
office." 2 He said that the framers of the Constitution had deliberately
substituted the word "devolve" for "exercise" and had intended the
clause "until another President be elected" as a limitation on the tenure
of an officer appointed by Congress but not on the Vice-President, who
was elected for a four-year term." 3
General interest and discussion ebbed and the problem was left un-
solved. It was to plague the Nation again during the Wilson administra-
tion.
C. Wilson
On September 3, 1919, President Woodrow Wilson left Washington
to begin a speaking tour of the country in order to gain public support
for the participation of the United States in the League of Nations.
Shortly after a speech in Pueblo, Colorado, on September 25, the fatigued
107. Id. at 65.
108. Symposium-Presidential Inability, 133 No. Am. Rev. 418-21 (1881). Senator
Trumbull believed that the Vice-President should act only when the "urgendes" of the
situation required it. The occasion would be characterized by the demand of the people
that he act. He said that inability applied to both physical and mental causes.
109. Id. at 434. The Vice-President, said General Butler, is the sole judge as to when
his duties begin and as to how they are to be exercised. Id. at 433.
110. Id. at 422-24. judge Cooley, however, believed that the Vice-President became
President where there was a complete vacancy.
111. Id. at 442-43. "Inability," according to Professor Dwight, means strict intellectual
incapacity, which should be established by forms of law prescribed by Congress.




President fell ill and had to cancel his tour and return to Washington.
On October 2 he suffered a stroke which paralyzed the left side of his
body. From then until March 4, 1921, when William G. Harding was
sworn in as twenty-ninth President, the Nation was without a real
leader . 4 This was clearly reflected in the Senate's rejection of American
participation in the League. It is generally believed that, had Wilson
been able to function as President, our participation would have become
a reality.
In the months following his stroke, the President was shielded by Mrs.
Wilson and Admiral Cary T. Grayson, his lifelong friend and physician,
to the extent that practically no one was permitted to see him."' The
Vice-President, Congress, the Cabinet and the people were left "in the
dark" as to his true condition. As a result, rumors constantly circulated
that the President was either insane or dead." 0 On one occasion Senator
Albert B. Fall of New Mexico, who doubted the President's sanity, and
Senator Gilbert Hitchcock of Nebraska, both of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, were permitted to see the President. William Allen
White, in his biography of Wilson, describes the meeting as follows:
"[T]hey had from Wilson thirty minutes of the gayest, blithest, sanest
talk they had heard in months.""' 7 The President, however, was seldom
capable of such vitality.
114. For good accounts of Wilson's illness, see Binkley, op. cit. supra note 84, at 281-83;
Daniels, The Life of Woodrow Wilson, 1856-1924, at 338-43 (1924); Hatch, Edith Boiling
Wilson, First Lady Extraordinary 204-34 (1961); Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson
271-78 (1958); 2 Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920, at 36-59
(1926); S. McKinley, Woodrow Wilson 266-78 (1957); Silva, op. cit. supra note 98, at 57-67;
Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him 434-56 (1921); Viereck, The Strangest Friend-
ship in History; Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House 293-303 (1932); W. White, Woodrow
Wilson, the Man, His Times and His Task 447-60 (1929).
115. See Hoover, op. cit. supra note 114, at 271-72; Houston, op. cit. supra note 114,
at 36-59; Lawrence, The True Story of Woodrow Wilson 290 (1924); Tumulty, op. cit.
supra note 114, at 437-38. See generally, Viereck, op. cit. supra note 114, at 304-18 ("The
Inaccessible President").
116. See generally Viereck, op. cit. supra note 114, at 301, 305-06. In his recent book,
Mr. Wilson's War (1962), John Dos Passos says at 492: "A few days after the President's
stroke, Lansing, profoundly disturbed, seeks out Tumulty in the cabinet room. In default
of any real information the wildest rumors are current in Washington. The President Is
dead. He has lost his mind and is confined in a straightjacket." Viereck, supra at 301,
says: "It was whispered in the Senate cloakroom that the President was insane. Behind
the bars the Senators pictured a raving maniac. No member of the Cabinet, not even the
Secretary of State, was permitted to approach the sick man's bedside. Even Tumulty was
compelled to wait in the anteroom." So it went. There was also talk of Secretary of State
Lansing's acting as President. See Koenig, The Invisible Presidency 245-47 (1960) (Colonel
House was opposed to Lansing's so acting).
117. White, op. cit. supra note 114, at 451.
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While Wilson lay ill, unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, many insisted that Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall assume
them.118 For fear he would oust the President if he did, Marshall, like
Arthur before him, declined to act."' Some twenty-eight bills became
law by default of any action by the President.2 Few public matters
reached him and the people seldom saw him for the remainder of the
term. Mrs. Wilson, Dr. Grayson and other members of the White House
Staff were said to be administering executive affairs. History appears to
corroborate this opinion." ' In her Memoir, Mrs. Edith Wilson says she
made no decision except as to what matters should go to the President.22
But was not this administration of presidential affairs?
Wilson did not call a meeting of the Cabinet until April 13, 1920."
In the interim the Cabinet met unofficially, largely under the direction
of Secretary of State Robert Lansing. 24 Furious that these meetings
were taking place, Wilson forced Lansing to resign. 2 5 "[T]he President's
118. See Viereck, op. cit. supra note 114, at 308-10, for a good account of the opinions
that something should be done. See the interesting description of the situation given by Dos
Passos, op. cit. supra note 116, at 492-93.
119. Vice-President Marshall was not unaware of the constitutional problems involved,
for during the fall of 1918 it was suggested that he act as President during Wilson's absence
from the United States. He refused to do so, largely because of the constitutional problems.
He said that he was not sure as to what he would do in the event of a congressional resolu-
tion that he act. He said he would act if a court of proper jurisdiction so decreed. Swisher,
American Constitutional Development 666-67 (1943). Former President Taft held the view
that the Constitution provided for an Acting President where the "public exigency" required
it. 57 Cong. Rec. 119-20 (1918).
120. For the details see 1958 Senate Hearings 234-35 (statement of Professor Lindsay
Rogers).
121. See 1956, 1957, 1958 Hearings; George & George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel
House 290-315 (1956) ("Defeat").
122. E. Wilson, My Memoir 289 (1939). Viereck, op. cit. supra note 114, at 293, states:
'For six and one-half months . . . a woman was virtually President of the United States."
See Hatch, op. ciL supra note 114, at 219. There is much speculation as to whether
Mrs. Wilson wanted her husband to resign. She says that she suggested the posibility to
Dr. Francis X. Dercum, Wilson's nerve specialist, and that he rejected it on the ground that
it would be bad for the country and the President. Accord, Hatch, op. cit. supra note 114,
at 222. On the other hand, two authors say that the President and Mrs. Wilson rejected any
thought of resignation. S. McKinley, op. cit. supra note 114, at 269; Viereck, op. cit. supra
note 114, at 322.
123. The meeting is poignantly described in Houston, op. cit. supra note 114, at 70.
124. The first meeting was held on October 6, 1919. Houston, op. cit. supra note 114,
at 36-59. Most authorities speak of twenty-one such meetings. See Brownell, supra note 101,
at 195; Silva, op. cit. supra note 94, at 60. One author speaks of more than twenty-five.
Viereck, op. cit. supra note 114, at 316.
125. Hoover, op. cit. supra note 114, at 275-76. Former President Herbert Hoover says
that Wilson's distrust of Lansing existed even before the illness. Id. at 276.
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action was that of a very sick man."'"2 The actual cause of the discharge
appears to have been a suspicion that Lansing was plotting to oust
Wilson. Patrick Tumulty, Wilson's secretary, reported that Lansing had
suggested that Vice-President Marshall act as President, to which
Tumulty answered: "You may rest assured that while Woodrow Wilson
is lying in the White House on the broad of his back I will not be a party
to ousting him.""' Wilson is reported to have said to Tumulty upon the
discharge of Lansing: "Tumulty, it is never the wrong time to spike
disloyalty. When Lansing sought to oust me, I was upon my back. I am
on my feet now and I will not have disloyalty about me.' 28
The aftermath of Wilson's inability saw a renewed discussion of the
problem. Then discussion fell into a lull until September of 1955.
D. Eisenhower
On September 24, 1955, while vacationing in Denver, Colorado,
President Dwight D. Eisenhower suffered a heart attack and the nation
once again was confronted with the problem of presidential inability.129
On the advice of General Howard Snyder, his physician, President
Eisenhower was removed to Fitzsimons General Hospital near Denver,
shortly after noon. Several hours later the country was informed that the
President had suffered a "mild coronary thrombosis." "Mild" was later
changed to "moderate."'3 0 Paul Dudley White, a noted heart specialist
126. Ibid.
127. Tumulty, op. cit. supra note 114, at 444.
128. Id. at 445.
129. The best accounts of the period are to be found in S. Adams, Firsthand Report: The
Story of the Eisenhower Administration 180-201 (1961); Donovan, Eisenhower: The
Inside Story 362-85 (1956); Nixon, Six Crises 131-81 (1962). See also Childs, Eisenhower:
Captive Hero 217-25 (1958); Rovere, The Eisenhower Years 319-328 (1956).
130. The sequence of events surrounding the heart attack, drawn largely from the
September 25, 26 and 27 issues of the New York Times, 1955, provides interesting back-
ground. The first announcement of the President's illness came at 8:00 A.M. (Denver time)
September 24. Acting White House Press Secretary Murray Snyder reported that the
President had suffered "'a digestive upset' during the night." N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1955,
p. 41, col. 2. This was repeated at press conferences at 9:30 A.M. and 12:15 P.M. At the
latter conference Murray Snyder said: "I just talked with General Snyder and he tells me
that the President is resting. He said that this indigestion is not serious and he says that
it is the same type of indigestion that many people have had." U.S. News & World Rep.,
Oct. 7, 1955, p. 68 ("When Ike's Heart Faltered") (contains excellent summary of the facts).
In the meantime, Maj. Gen. Howard Snyder, the President's personal physician, who
had been called to his bedside at about 3:00 A.M. and had remained with him ever since,
decided to remove the President to the hospital. The President was driven to the hospital
in the early part of the afternoon. Upon arrival, he was placed under oxygen. At about
2:40 P.M., Acting Press Secretary Snyder broke the news, at a hurriedly called press
conference, that the President was in the hospital. He stated: "The President has just had
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from Boston, was summoned and he reported that the President would
be ready for conferences within two weeks. Since the heart attack came
at a time when Congress was not in session and since the programs for
1956 were in their early stages and no emergencies existed in the
foreign or domestic spheres, the question of Vice-President Richard M.
Nixon's assuming executive responsibilities was not seriously consid-
ered.' Management of the executive branch was left to Sherman Adams,
assistant to the President, Vice-President Nixon, Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., Secretary
of the Treasury George M. Humphrey, and White House Assistant, Gen-
eral Wilton Persons." 2 The Cabinet met for the first time on September
a mild coronary thrombosis. He has just been driven to Fitzsimons [Army] General
Hospital. He was taken to the hospital in his own car and walked from the house to the
car." Ibid. This was repeated, in substance, at 3:05 P.M. At 3:45 P.M. Murray Snyder read
the following bulletin: "'General Snyder informs me that the President had a mild indiges-
tion yesterday evening. He had the first symptoms of an occlusion, or thrombosis, at
2:45 A.M. Upon completion of his diagnosis, the general decided to move the President to
the hospital where he could be given better treatment. The general says the President has
been comfortable since the initial pain [and) that the prognosis is good." N.Y. Times,
Sept. 25, 1955, p. 41, col. 1. Substantially the same report was made at 8:00 P.M. At about
10:15 P.M. the word "mild" was dropped from the official medical description of the heart
attack and the "good" prognosis was dropped from the reports pending the arrival of Dr.
Mattingly. U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 7, 1955, p. 74. Dr. Paul Dudley White arrived
in the afternoon of the following day and went into consultation with Drs. Snyder, Mat-
tingly, Pollock, Powell and Griffin. A medical bulletin was issued at 4:12 P.M.., stating that
the President "'has had a moderate attack of coronary thrombosis without complications.'
N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1955, p. 21, col. 3. Dr. White gave the President a thorough examina-
tion on Monday, September 26, and reported at a news conference later in the day that
the President "has had an average attack' He said that the President would have to have
complete rest for about a month. Complications, he said, might well set in during the first
two weeks. Only time could tell. Id. at cols. 1-8 (transcript of press conference).
131. The question was of some importance, however, during the first few days after
the heart attack. James C. Haggerty, White House Press Secretary, reported on Sunday
evening, September 25, that the Attorney General's office had been asked for an opinion "on
the legality of delegating President Eisenhower's authority while he is in the hospital unable
to handle any official duties." Id. at col. 6. On the following day, a Justice Department
spokesman said an opinion would be ready later in the week. Id. at 26, col. 1. See Donovan,
op. cit. supra note 129, at 369, where the author says that acting Attorney General, William
P. Rogers, ordered a study of the problem of delegating non-constitutional functions, on
Monday, September 26. Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., who had been on vacation
in Spain, returned on Tuesday, September 27, and stated that there were "sufficient legal
arrangements to carry on 'the day-to-day operations of the government."' N.Y. Times, Sept.
28, 1955, p. 1, col. 6. He stated further that "'I don't know that it will be necessary to deliver
a legal opinion' as requested by the summer White House in Denver." Ibid. No opinion
appears to have been delivered.
132. It appears that Nixon, Rogers and Persons met in the evening of September 24
and decided that the Cabinet and the White House Staff should continue the administration
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30, and it was then decided that the Government would function under
general policy directives previously given by the President.188 On the
same day President Eisenhower performed his first official act since his
heart attack, that of signing lists of foreign officer appointments.8 4
During Eisenhower's illness the Cabinet met regularly and was pre-
sided over by Vice-President Nixon.' The President was kept informed
of the meetings and was represented at them in the person of Sherman
Adams. 30 Yet, all "were well aware that a national or international
of the Government. Donovan, op. cit. supra note 129, at 368. On the following day, Vice-
President Nixon, who was informed of the President's attack before the public, announced
that "the President's well-defined policies and Government business would be carried out
without delay." N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1955, p. 26, col. 4. Similar statements were to be
echoed by other members of the Cabinet. In order to be consistent with this approach,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, and
Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks left the United States on September 25 for talks
in Canada regarding economic and trade matters. On Monday, September 26, Vice-President
Nixon announced, after a luncheon conference with Rogers, Adams (who had returned
from abroad) and Persons, that the Cabinet would meet on Friday, September 30. Id. at 1,
col. 7.
133. The Cabinet meeting was preceded by a meeting of the National Security Council,
held on September 29. That meeting also was presided over by Vice-President Nixon. (It
had been scheduled before the heart attack.) The Cabinet meeting is well described by
Donovan, op. cit. supra note 129, at 371-75. The following statement (in part) was issued
by Murray Snyder after the meeting: "After full discussion of pending matters, it was con-
cluded that there are no obstacles to the orderly and uninterrupted conduct of the foreign
and domestic affairs of the nation during the period of rest ordered by the President's
physicians. Governor Sherman Adams, the Assistant to the President, will leave for Denver
today and will be available there, in consultation with the President's physicians, when-
ever it may later become appropriate to present any matters to the President. The policies
and programs of the administration as determined and approved by the President are well
established along definite lines and are well known. Co-ordination of the activities of the
several departments of the government within the framework of these policies wlil be con-
tinued by full co-operation among the responsible officers of these departments so that the
functions of the government will be carried forward in an effective manner during the
absence of the President." Id. at 373. Thus Sherman Adams was to take charge In Denver,
where James Haggerty had been the liaison previously.
134. Adams, op. cit. supra note 129, at 188. During the third and fourth weeks after
the heart attack, the President began to have visitors and, shortly thereafter, began to
perform official acts. Id. at 19.
135. For a brief account of these meetings, see Donovan, op. cit. supra note 129, at
378-85.
136. Ibid. As would be expected, rumors circulated that Sherman Adams was running
the country. See, e.g., U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 14, 1955, p. 56 ("If It's O.K. With
Adams, It's O.K. With Eisenhower"); id., Oct. 7, 1955, p. 26 ("Who's Running the Country
Now"). See also id., Dec. 20, 1957, p. 88 ("What Goes On in White House When the
President Is Sick"); id., July 6, 1956, p. 28 ("Stand-In for the President"). See generally
Koenig, The Invisible Presidency 338-404 (1960).
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emergency could have arisen during the President's illness to make this
unofficial government by 'community of understanding' entirely inade-
quate."'37 No such emergency arose.
On November 22, at his Camp David retreat in the Catoctin Mountains
of Maryland, President Eisenhower met with his Cabinet for the first
time since the illness.'38 By mid-January 1956, he was back at his desk
in the White House.'39 As Sherman Adams said:
And so this interlude of sickness and uncertainty came to an end. But it left us
uncomfortably aware of the Constitution's failure to provide for the direction of the
government by an acting President when the President is temporarily disabled and
unable ,to perform his functions.140
On two other occasions during the Eisenhower administration, the
question of presidential inability was forcibly revived. On June 8, 1956,
President Eisenhower suffered an attack of ileitis and the next day under-
went an emergency operation. He was discharged from Walter Reed
Hospital on June 30 and returned to the White House in July. 4 ' On
November 25, 1957, a so-called "little stroke" temporarily impaired his
speech, but he was back at his job within a few days.14 -
137. Adams, op. cit. supra note 129, at 185. Accord, Nixon, Six Crises 150 (1962).
138. Adams, op. cit supra note 129, at 191-92. "Some of them [members of the Cabinet]
were openly astonished by the President's fast recovery ... ." Id. at 191. President Eisen-
hower was discharged from the hospital on November 11. He returned to Washington for
a brief period and then departed for Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1955, § 4 (The News of the Week in Review), p. E, cols. 1-3. He was to spend his con-
valescence there, in Georgia and in Florida.
139. The President returned to Washington during the week of January 16, and held
his first press conference on Thursday, January 19, 1956. Id., Jan. 20, 1956, p. 1, col. 8;
see also id., Jan. 22, 1956, § 4 (The News of the Week in Review), p. E, col. 1; Newseek,
Jan. 16, 1956, p. 17 ("Ike in Fine Fettle: The Word Later"); U.S. News & World Rep,
Jan. 27, 1956, p. 94 ("Ike Discusses His Health, His Job, His Secretary of State").
140. Adams, op. cit. supra note 129, at 192. The author discusses President Eisenhower's
attempts to stir congressional action. Former Speaker Sam Rayburn was against any action.
In all, says Adams, the legislative leaders showed little enthusiasm in regard to taking steps to
effect a solution of the problem. Id. at 200-01.
141. See N.Y. Times, June 10, 1956, § 4 (The News of the Week in Review), p. E,
cols. 1-7, for an excellent account of the background facts. See also U.S. News & World
Rep., June 21, 1957, p. 34 ("When a President Gets Sick"), and Nixon, op. cit. supra note
129, at 167-69.
142. The facts are well reported in N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1957, p. 1, cols. 4-8, and Nixon,
op. cit. supra note 129, at 170-78. Sherman Adams reports that the President again attempted
to have Congress solve the constitutional problem. Again, the leaders showed little enthusiasm
for action. Adams, op. cit. supra note 129, at 201. "Disregard of the public interest, the
President called it." Ibid.
Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr. is reported to have said that "'for such
a situation to continue' . . . 'would be reckless beyond belief.'" Life, Dec. 9, 1957, pp. 33, 37
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The Eisenhower illnesses, besides accentuating the constitutional prob-
lem, jolted Congress into action. Special Subcommittees of the House
and Senate Committees on the Judiciary were formed to study the prob-
lem. In 1956, 1957, and again in 1958, hearings were held at which a
number of authorities gave their views. Every aspect of the problem was
scrutinized and many possible solutions were offered. Yet a final solution
was never decided upon by Congress.
III. OTHER CONSTITUTIONS
A. State Constitutions
Succession provisions are to be found in the fifty state constitutions.14
A lieutenant governor, president of the Senate or secretary of state is
usually next in line to the Governor. All state constitutions provide for
the contingencies of death, resignation or removal (or vacancy). Some
provide for the absence of the Governor from the state.144
The expression "inability" as a contingency upon which the succession
provision becomes operative is used in twenty-two state constitutions l' t1
("Time of Trial for the Republic"). See U.S. News & World Rep., Dec. 20, 1957, p. 88
("What Goes On in White House When the President is Sick"); id., Dec. 6, 1957, p. 33
("Ike's Illness-What Will It Mean?"); id. at 48 ("Nixon's New Role"); id. at 108 ("The
Hour-by-Hour Reports on the President's Illness").
143. Unlike the other state constitutions, the succession provision in the Tennessee Con-
stitution is limited to cases of death, resignation and removal from office. Tenn. Const.
art. III, § 12. The appendix contains a chart which shows the alignment of the fifty states
on the matters discussed herein. A good discussion of state practice can be found in Hansen,
Executive Disability: A Void in State and Federal Law, 40 Neb. L. Rev. 697 (1961); see
Note, Gubernatorial Disability, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 521 (1941).
144. See Ala. Const. art. V, § 127, which provides that if the Governor is absent for more
than twenty days, the secretary of state is to notify the lieutenant governor, who then will
act as Governor. Compare McGregor v. Allen, 33 La. Ann. 870 (1881) (short absence not
sufficient), with [1948-1950] 849 Mich. Att'y Gen. Biennial Rep. 49 (Nov. 8, 1948) (short
absence sufficient to allow successor to act as Governor); and compare Ex parte Hawkins,
10 Okla. Crim. 396, 136 Pac. 991 (1913) (upon return to state the Governor automatically
resumes his powers and duties), with In re An Act Concerning Alcoholic Beverages, 130
N.J.L. 123, 31 A.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (president of senate must be notified of the return).
See also Markham v. Cornell, 136 Kan. 884, 18 P.2d 158 (1933) (temporary absence does not
make Governor incapable).
145. The word "disability" is also found in many of these state constitutions, as It Is
in the United States Constitution, as part of the clause limiting the tenure of the successor,
e.g., "until the disability be removed." The twenty-two states are: Ark. Const. amend. VI,
§ 4; Conn. Const. art. IV, § 17; Del. Const. art. III, § 20; Fla. Const. art. IV, § 19;
Hawaii Const. art. IV, § 4; Idaho Const. art. IV, § 12; Ind. Const. art. 5, § 10;
La. Const. art. V, § 6; Mich. Const. art. VI, § 16; Mont. Const. art. VII, § 14; Nev.
Const. art. V, § 18; N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, g 7; N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 5; N.C. Const.
art. III, § 12; Okla. Const. art. VI, § 16; Ore. Const. art. V, § 8; R.I. Const. art. VII,
§ 9; Tex. Const. art. IV, § 16; Utah Const. art. VII, § 11; Vt. Const. ch. II, § 24; Va.
Const. art. V, § 78; Wis. Const. art. V, § 7.
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Eighteen states refer to "disability."' 140 A variety of expressions is em-
bodied in the remaining state constitutions, such as "otherwise" (vacant
office),"' "other disqualification,"'148 "vacancy.. . from any cause what-
ever," 49 "from any cause, unable,"'5 ° "for any reason unable," 15 ' "from
mental or physical disease or otherwise . . . incapable,"5 2 and "unable,
from protracted illness."' 53 One state constitution has no provision at all
in point..
54
Of the forty-nine state constitutions having succession provisions in
point, forty-one expressly delimit the tenure of the officer next in line to
either (1) the length of the period of disability, or (2) the length of the
period of disability or the remainder of the term, or (3) the length of
the period of disability or until a new governor is elected.5 5 One state
is less clear, although an "acting" governor is referred to elsewhere in
that state constitution.'5 6 In three states the successor temporarily
exercises the powers and duties until a new governor is elected.15 7 Two
state constitutions provide for devolution of the "office,"' 8  with no
limitation on tenure, while two others declare that the office shall be
146. In these states, the word "disability" is used in that part of the provision which
describes the contingencies as well as in the part limiting the tenure of the successor.
The eighteen states are: Ala. Coast. art. V, § 127; Alaska Const. art. III, § 12; Ariz. Const
art. V, § 6; Cal. Const. art. V, § 16; Colo. Const. art. IV, § 13; Ga. Const. arL V, § 2-3007;
Ill. Const. art. V, § 17; Iowa Const. art. IV, § 17; Kan. Coast. art. I, § 11; Mo. Const. art.
IV, § 11; Neb. Coast. art. IV, § 16; N.D. Coast. art. HI, § 72; Ohio Const. art. III, § 15;
Pa. Const. art. IV, § 13; S.C. Const. art. IV, § 9; S.D. Const. art. IV, § 6; Wash. Coast.
art. H, § 10; W. Va. Const. art. VII, § 16.
147. Me. Const. art. V, pt. I, § 14; Mass. ConsL pt. H, ch. II, § 2, art. III; NE. CoasL
pt. H, art. 49.
148. Md. Coast. art. II, § 6.
149. Minn. Coast. art. V, § 6.
150. Ky. Const. § 84.
151. N.M. Const. art. V, § 7.
152. Wyo. Const. art. IV, § 6.
153. Miss. Coast. art. V, § 131.
154. Tenn. CoasL art. In, § 12.
155. For the exceptions, see notes 156-59 infra.
156. Ind. Const. art. V, § 10 (same as U.S. Cost. art. H, § 1, cd. 6); see art. V,
§ 11, for words of acting.
157. Ga. Const. art. V, § 1, f1 2-2608; Me. ConsL art. V, pt. I, § 14; 'Ad. Coast. art.
II, § 7.
158. Va. CoasL art. V, § 78. R.I. Coast. arL VII, § 9 provides that the lieutenant
governor shall fill the office of governor and exercise his powers and authority until a
Governor is qualified to act or until the office is filled at the next election. The con-
tingencies are "vacancy in the office of Governor or ...his inability to serve, impeach-
ment, or absence from the State. .. ."
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deemed vacant if the governor has been unable to perform for a period
of six months by reason of "mental or physical disability.""
Some states differentiate, without more, between temporary and perma-
nent disability.' Apart from any explicit constitutional authorization,
two states have passed laws establishing disability boards. 1 1 Only a
few state constitutions set forth disability procedures. The Alabama,
Mississippi and Michigan Constitutions are unique in this regard.
The Alabama Constitution contains a procedure by which any two
officers in the line of succession, except the one next in line, who believe
the governor to be of unsound mind, may petition the state supreme
court for a determination. If the court determines that the Governor is of
unsound mind, it will enter a decree to that effect, which is filed in the
Office of the Secretary of State. Then, the officer next in line performs the
duties of the office until the Governor recovers. If there is a dispute as to
whether the Governor has recovered, the state supreme court, at the
request of any one officer in the line of succession, must "ascertain the
truth" and render a decree." 2
The Mississippi Constitution refers to "protracted illness" as a dis-
ability and provides that if there is any doubt as to whether a disability
exists or has ended, the Secretary of State shall submit the question to
the state supreme court. The court, or a majority thereof, must investi-
gate and render an opinion to the Secretary of State which opinion is
"final and conclusive.' 0 3
The new Michigan Constitution provides that the inability of the Gov-
ernor shall be determined by a majority of the Supreme Court on the joint
request of the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives. "Such determination shall be final and
conclusive." Once an inability is found to exist, the Lieutenant Governor
exercises the powers and duties of the office until the Supreme Court
determines upon its own initiative that the inability has ended. 04
The proposed revised Florida Constitution contains an interesting
159. Alaska Const. art. III, § 12; N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, fI 8.
160. E.g., Ariz. Const. art. V, § 6; Cal. Const. art. V, § 16; S.C. Const. art. IV, § 9.
161. Neb. Laws 1961, ch. 452, §§ 1-4, at 1379-81; Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 176.040, 176.050
(1959). Both laws are similar. They provide for a Disability Board of the Chief Justice,
the Dean of the state medical school, and a leading medical official. The Board determines
the commencement and termination of a disability and decisions must be unanimous.
The Nebraska statute is alone in providing that the decisions are reviewable by the state
supreme court on the petition of the Governor. In the interim the successor has the authority.
162. Ala. Const. art. V, § 128. In such case, the governor does not return until it Is
so decreed.
163. Miss. Const. art. 5, § 131.
164. Mich. Const. art. V, § 26.
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provision on executive succession. It provides for a lieutenant governor
who is to act as Governor during the physical or mental incapacity of
the Governor. If the Governor dies, resigns or is removed, the Lieutenant
Governor succeeds to the office for the remainder of the term. Incapacity
is determined by the supreme court after the docketing of a written
suggestion thereof by four members of an executive cabinet of which the
Lieutenant Governor is not a member. Restoration of capacity is also
determined by the Supreme Court after the docketing of a written sug-
gestion thereof by the Governor, legislature or four members of the
cabinet. The proposed constitution also provides that the Governor may
declare his own physical incapacity and in such case the cessation thereof
by filing a certificate with the secretary of state. 5
A different kind of procedure is to be found in the New Jersey and
Alaska Constitutions. New Jersey provides that if the Governor has been
unable to discharge his duties for a period of six months "by reason of
mental or physical disability," his office shall be deemed vacant. The
vacancy is determined by the state supreme court as follows: (1) upon
presentment to it of a concurrent resolution declaring the grounds of
vacancy, adopted by two thirds of the members of both houses of the
legislature; and (2) upon notice, a hearing before the court and proof
that the vacancy exists. 1 The Alaska Constitution provides that the
"procedure for determining ... disability shall be prescribed by law,"'0 7
and that if the Governor has been unable to perform for a period of six
months "by reason of mental or physical disability," his office shall be
deemed vacant."0 8
B. Foreign Constitutions
About fifty per cent of the nations of the world give the title "Presi-
dent" to their chief executive.0 9 Over one half of these nations provide
for the direct election of the President, 17 while others provide for his
appointment by the legislative body.17 ' Other nations have royal person-
165. Art. IV, § 9.
166. N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, 1 8.
167. Alaska Const. art. III, § 12. No statute has been passed.
168. Alaska Const. art. III, § 12.
169. In 1956, forty-one countries, or forty-six per cent of all nations, had a President
as Chief Executive. 1 Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations 11 (2d ed. 1956) (hereinafter
cited as Peaslee).; see Fitzgibbon, The Constitutions of the Americas (1948). Since 1956,
the following republics have emerged, having a President as Chief Executive: Algeria,
Cameroun, Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mali, Niger, Somalia
and Upper Volta. See Information Please Almanac 618-769 (1963) for a more comprehensive
listing.
170. E.g., Finland, France (as of October 28, 1962, referendum) and Ireland (Eire).
171. E.g., Germany, Israel and Turkey.
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ages as their chief executives.' 72 Still others give executive authority to a
council. 73
In some of the countries where there is a president as chief execu-
tive, he is little more than a figurehead. In other countries, particularly
in Latin America and Africa, he is an active leader. However, the
constitution in almost all presidential systems represents what the framers
considered to be the ideal, so that the various other approaches to
executive succession merit examination in any search for the best
solution.
Somewhat detailed inability procedures are found in a few countries.
By a Regency Act of 1937,' the following solution was adopted for
determining disability of a Sovereign in the United Kingdom. A com-
mission, consisting of the spouse of the Sovereign, the Lord Chancellor,
the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Lord Chief Justice of England
and the Master of the Rolls, may declare in writing that the Sovereign
is "by reason of infirmity of mind or body" incapable of performing
the royal functions.' 75 Any three may so declare. Until it is declared in
a like manner that "His Majesty has so far recovered His health as
to warrant His resumption of the royal functions . . . ," a Regent shall
act in his place.'
76
The Constitution of Pakistan lays down an interesting procedure for
determining the President's physical or mental incapacity. 7 One third
of all the members of the National Assembly can notice the Speaker of
the Assembly in writing that they intend to make a motion in the Assembly
for the removal of the President on grounds of physical or mental in-
capacity. 78 The Speaker will then transmit the notice to the President, 7"
with a request that he submit himself within ten days to an examination
by a Medical Board of five medical practitioners. 180 The resolution
172. E.g., Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
173. E.g., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
174. 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 16.
175. 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 16, § 2(1). The finding must include evidence provided
by physicians.
176. Ibid. In less serious situations (e.g., absence from the country), the Sovereign Is
permitted to make partial delegations of power to counsellors of state, which Include the
spouse of the Sovereign, if any, and the four persons next in line of succession to the
Crown. 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 16, § 6(2). The delegation, however, may be revoked or
varied in like manner. 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 16, § 6(1).
177. Pak. Const. pt. III, ch. 1, art. 14(1)-(9).
178. Pak. Const. pt. III, ch. 1, art. 14(1). The writing must set forth the particulars of
the alleged incapacity. Pak. Const. pt. III, ch. 1, art. 14(2).
179. Pak. Const. pt. III, ch. 1, art. 14(3).
180. The medical practitionets are the most senior medical officers in the civil health
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cannot be moved earlier than fourteen days or later than thirty days
after notice to the Speaker."8' If the President has submitted to an
examination, the resolution cannot be voted upon until the Medical
Board has had an opportunity to render an opinion."2 The President
has the right to appear and be represented when the resolution is
considered.8 3 A vote of three fourths of the entire Assembly is necessary
to remove the President from office.' 4 The Pakistan Constitution also
provides that at any time when the office is vacant or the President is
unable to perform his functions because of illness, absence from the
country or otherwise, the Speaker of the Assembly shall act as
President. 85
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa contains a provision
under which the President may be removed from office on the ground of
misconduct or inability to perform efficiently the duties of his office."'
The first step in the procedure to remove the President is a petition by
not less than thirty members of the House of Assembly, requesting the
appointment of a joint committee of the House and Senate to consider
the matter. 7 After its appointment the joint committee studies the
matter and then submits a report of its findings to both Houses.'" The
report is considered and both Houses might then pass a resolution
declaring the President removed from office on the ground of misconduct
or inability. The Constitution also provides that whenever the office
of President is vacant or the President is unable to perform his duties,
the President of the Senate shall serve as acting President."s
A State Tenure Law of 1951 in Israel contains a provision by which
Knesseth (Parliament), upon a proposal of three fourths of the House
Committee, may declare by three fourths of its members that "for
service, the medical service of the Army, the health service of East Pakistan, the health
service of West Pakistan, and the consultant physician to the Army. Pak. Const. pt. M, ch. I,
art. 15.
181. Pak. Const. pt. m, ch. 1, art. 14(4).
182. Pak. Const. pt. MI, ch. 1, art. 14(7). If the President has not submitted himself
to an examination by the Medical Board before the resolution is moved, it may be voted
upon.
183. Pak. Const. pt. III, ch. 1, art. 14(5).
184. Pak. Const. pt. III, ch. 1, art. 14(8). Interestingly, if the President submits himself
to an examination and less than one half of the Assembly vote in favor of the removal, the
members who noticed the resolution cease to be members of the Assembly. Pak. ConsL
pt. II, ch. I, art. 14(9).
185. Pak. Const. pt. III, ch. I, art. 16.
186. S. Air. Const. § 10(1) (b)..
187. S. Mr. Const. § 10(2) (b).
188. S. Afr. Const. § 10(2) (a).
189. S. Ar. Const. § 11.
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reasons of health the President is permanently unable to carry out his
functions.""' The Chairman of the Knesseth then acts as President. If
three fourths of the House Committee find only a temporary disability,
the Chairman acts until the expiration of the period fixed by the Com-
mittee in its decision, or sooner if the President says he is able to
perform his duties, and the Committee agrees.
The Constitution of Ireland provides for a commission of three,
consisting of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Chairman of
the Dail Eireann (House) and the Chairman of the Seanard Eireann
(Senate).' The commission exercises the executive powers in cases of
temporary or permanent incapacity. A permanent incapacity must be
established to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court, consisting of not
less than five judges. Then a new election must be held within sixty
days. 9 2
Apart from the above, the constitutions of countries having a President
are generally silent on the procedures for determining the commence-
ment and termination of inability. A few constitutions give a general
power to the legislature,' supreme court9 4 or other body90 to declare
the existence of a permanent impediment. Most constitutions refer to
temporary and permanent situations, 9 ' without more. They prescribe
190. 2 Peaslee 475.
191. Ire. Const. art. 14, §§ 1, 2(1).
192. Ire. Const. art. 12, § 3(1), (3).
193. E.g., Ecuador Const. art. 87 provides: "The functions of the President . . .are
definitively terminated . . . by permanent physical or mental incapacity, declared by
Congress." In Colombia the Senate may declare "permanent physical incapacity." Colom.
Const. art. 125. Peru Const. art. 144 provides: "The presidency of the Republic Is
vacated . . . by permanent physical or moral incapacity of the President, declared by
Congress." Article 145 further provides: "The exercise of the presidency of the Republic
is suspended . . . by the temporary physical incapacity of the President, declared by
Congress ...
194. Gabon Const. art. 10.
195. Malagasy Const. art. 9 (a Superior Council of Institutions). Port. Const. art. 80,
§ 1 (Council of State, summoned by the President of the Council of Ministers), Fr. Const.
art. 7 (Constitutional Council).
196. Argen. Const. art. 75 (illness, absence from Capital, death, resignation or removal);
Aus. Const. art. 64(1) (unable to perform duties or a permanent vacancy) ; Bol. Const. art.
91 (unable to fulfill duties or temporarily absent); Braz. Const. art. 79 (impediment or
vacancy in office); Burma Const. § 64(1) (temporary or permanent absence or incapacity;
death, resignation or removal); Chile Const. art. 66 (illness, absence from territory, or other
weighty reason; death, resignation or absolute impossibility); Colom. Const. arts. 123-25
(may temporarily retire on account of ill health; death, resignation, removal, abandonment
of office, or permanent physical incapacity); Costa Rica Const. art. 135 (temporary or
permanent absence); Dahomey Const. art. 9 (replaces President when necessary, whether
temporarily or permanently); Dom. Rep. Const. art. 51 (temporary absence or permanent
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that in the former the constitutional successor' 9 7 serves until the tem-
porary situation has ended. In the latter, the successor serves until
a new president is elected, which is usually at an election by the legisla-
ture or the people held within a certain period of time."'8 Some constitu-
vacancy); Ecuador Const. art. 87 (death, removal, resignation, abandonment of office, or
permanent physical or mental incapacity); El Sal. Const. art. 64 (temporary incapacity, death,
resignation, removal or other cause); Fin. Const. art. 25 (temporary or lasting disability);
Gabon Const. arts. 9-10 (temporary impediment or permanent vacancy); Ger. Const. art. 57
("prevented from exercising his powers"; "office falls prematurely vacant"); Guat. Const.
art. 165 (definitive or temporary absence); Guinea Const. art. 28 (vacancy); Haiti Const.
arts. 80-81 (temporarily impossible to perform duties; vacancy for any reason) ; Hond. Const.
art. 201 (temporary or absolute absence); Iceland Const. art. 8 (temporary residence
abroad, illness or other reasons; vacant office) ; India Const. art. 65(1)-(2) (vacancy due to
death, removal, resignation or otherwise; unable due to absence, illness or other cause);
Italy Const. art. 86 (unable to fulfill functions or permanent incapacity, death or resigna-
tion); Ivory Coast Const. art. 11 (death, resignation, or permanent impediment); Korea
Cost. art. 70 (inability to exercise power, of vacancy) ; Lebanon Const. art. 62 (vacancy) ;
Malagasy Const. art. 9 (temporary impediment or vacancy for any reason); Mex. Coast.
arts. 84-85 (temporary or absolute disability); Nic. Const. art. 188 (temporary or permanent
inability to serve); Pan. Cost. art. 149 (temporary or permanent absence); Par. Const. art.
58 (resignation, temporary or permanent inability or death) ; Peru Const. arts. 144-45 (death,
permanent physical or moral incapacity, resignation, or temporary physical incapacity) ; Port.
Const. art. 80 (temporary interruption, death, resignation, permanent physical disability, or
absence abroad) ; P.R. Coast. tit. III. §§ 7-8 (temporary disability or permanent incapacity;
death, resignation, removal, or other absolute disability); Tunisia Cost. art. 51 (death,
resignation or total inability); Tur. Cost. art. 100 (temporarily absent for travels
or illness, demise, or resignation; vacancy for any other reason); Ur. Const. art. 158
(absence, vacancy, temporary impediment, or leave of the councillor serving as president);
Ven. Const. art. 188 (temporary absence, which may be absolute after ninety days). For
succession provisions patterned after U.S. Coast. art. II, § 1, c. 6, see Liberia Const. art.
3, § 2; Phil. Const. art. VIII, § 8.
197. The successor varies from country to country. Compare, Argen. Cost. arts. 75-77
(popularly elected Vice-President); Burma Const. § 64(1)-(7) (a commission of members of
legislature and judiciary); Chile Const. art. 66 (a minister, in accordance with order of
precedence fixed by law, substitutes as Vice-President); Colom. Const. art. 124 (a designate
previously elected by Congress); Gabon Cost. art. 8 (a Vice-President appointed by the
President); Guinea Const. art. 28 (the President's cabinet); Hond. Const. arts. 193-94
(popularly elected presidential designate); Iceland Const. art. 8 (a commission of the
Prime Minister, Speaker of Parliament, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court); Italy
Cost. art. 86 (Speaker of the Senate); Ivory Coast Const. art. 11 (person chosen by
President of the Assembly); Korea Const. art. 70 (Prime Minister); Nic. Const. art. 188
(designate appointed by the President); Port. Const. art. 80, § 2 (President of Council of
Ministers) ; Tur. Cost. art. 100 (Chairman of Senate).
198. Sometimes whether or not there is an election depends on when the vacancy
occurs. Thus, in Mexico, a permanent vacancy during the first two years of the six-year
term requires an election; during the last four, an appointment. Mex. Cost. art. 84.
See Pan. Const. art. 151; Par. Const. art. 58. In Austria, a permanent vacancy
requires an immediate election, while a disability of more than twenty days calls for an
interim appointment. Aus. Const. art. 64(1)-(2).
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tions provide for a constitutional successor for the remainder of the
term, such as a Vice-President or presidential designate. 110 In all, most
constitutions appear to leave questions of inability to the executive
branch.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
During the congressional inability hearings in 1956, 1957 and 1958,
it was generally agreed that any solution to the problem must make at
least two points clear: (1) that in cases of death, resignation and removal,
the Vice-President succeeds to the office of the President for the remainder
of the term, and (2) that in cases of inability, the Vice-President merely
exercises the powers and duties of the Presidency for the period of
inability."' Many felt that the President should be able to declare his
own inability and that no definition of inability should be enacted into
law.20' Many, too, were of the opinion that a constitutional amendment
was necessary for any real solution.20 2 Some recommended a detailed
constitutional amendment, and others an amendment merely giving
Congress the power to establish a procedure. 0 3 Still others suggested a
stopgap statute, followed by a constitutional amendment.204 On the
199. E.g., Costa Rica Const. art. 135; Dahomey Const. art. 11; El Sal. Const. art. 64;
Ecuador Const. arts. 88, 91; Nic. Const. art. 188. France is expected to create an office
of Vice-President. He would succeed to the presidential office. N.Y. Times, April 3, 1963,
p. 5, cols. 3-4.
200. See House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Presidential Inability:
An Analysis of Replies to a Questionnaire and Testimony at a Hearing on Presidential
Inability 49-51 (Comm. Print 1957) (hereinafter cited as 1957 Analysis), for a listing
of those who were of the opinion that only powers and duties devolve under the present
wording of the Constitution.
201. Id. at 5-8. Some, however, favored a definition of inability. Professor Everett
S. Brown of the University of Michigan thought that any law "should provide for both
physical and mental disability, permanent and temporary." Id. at 9. Joseph E. Kallenbach
of the same University said that "'inability,' in the constitutional sense, has reference to a
mental or physical condition or any other condition, which prevents the actual exercise
of the powers and duties of the office of President as the public interest and necessities
require." Id. at 10. Professor Arnold J. Lien of Washington University stated that "the
wording of any provision relating to 'inability' should be general enough to cover the
unavailability of the President for the performance of his duties whatever the cause
involved might be-mental or physical illness, airplane crash in some inaccessible place,
kidnaping, wartime capture, etc." Ibid.
202. Id. at 59-63; 1958 Senate Hearings 26-27 (remarks of former Senator Joseph C.
O'Mahoney).
203. See notes 231-33 infra and accompanying text.
204. See 1956 House Hearings 64 (remarks of Arthur Krock of the New York Times).
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other hand, some thought that a statute'0 5 or resolution 00 of Congress
would be sufficient. A few relied on quo warranto2- 7  or mandamus
proceedings. 20 8
205. See 1958 Senate Hearings 108-09 (remarks of Henry Fowler); 1957 Analysis
63-68; 1956 House Hearings 122 (remarks of Professor Roger P. Peters). A large number
of the authorities in favor of action by Congress believe that Congress has the power
to legislate in this area under the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution. U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See, e.g., 1958 Senate Hearings 108-09 (remarks of Henry Fowler)
and 238 (letter of Professor James Hart); Corwin, The President: Offices and Powers,
1787-1957, at 54-55 (1957). Against a solution under the necessary and proper clause
is the fact that Congress has been given no specific power over inability questions
other than the power to determine the successor where both President and Vice-President
are immobilized. In Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 88 (1907), the Supreme Court said
that the necessary and proper clause was to be exercised only in connection with specific
delegations of power to Congress or other departments or offices. The specific power in
question is that of the Vice-President to act as President. If Congress were to relocate,
without a constitutional amendment, the power of determining inability in any entity other
than the Vice-Presidency, its action would be unconstitutional, for "it is axiomatic that when
the Constitution imposes a duty on an officer, to be done by him, he must be the sole
judge when and how to do that duty .... " Butler, 133 No. Am. Rev. 435 (1881); see
generally Silva, Presidential Succession 107 (1951).
James Madison, himself, stated that the clause is "but merely a declaration, for
the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into execution those [powers]
otherwise granted are included in the grant." 6 Writings of James Madison 383 (Hunt
ed. 1906). See Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960), (The necessary and
proper clause is "not itself a grant of power . . . ."); United States v. Oregon, 366
U.S. 643, 653 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Only recently we warned against an expan-
sive construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause.")
206. See 1956 House Hearings 42 (remarks of Dr. John H. Romani), 53 (remarks of
Sidney Hyman), 97 (remarks of Professor James Hart), 121 (Professor Aikin). Instead of
a joint resolution, which must be submitted to the President for his signature (U.S. Const.
art. 1, § 7, c. 3.), some suggest that Congress go on record by way of a concurrent resolu-
tion that the Vice-President succeed temporarily to the powers and duties of the office in
cases of inability. A concurrent resolution is not subject to the President's veto power.
However, it does not have the force of law. See Riddick, The United States Congress
Organization and Procedure 21-22 (1949) ; Watkins & Riddick, Senate Procedure: Precedent
and Practices 167-68 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1958).
207. See note 245-46 infra and accompanying text.
208. See Barnard v. Taggart, 66 N.H. 362, 29 Adt. 1026 (1890), where a writ of mandamus
was issued to the Attorney General of the state, compelling the President of the Senate to
act as Governor. For a good account of this case, see Wyman, US. News & World Rep.,
March 9, 1956, p. 44 ("When a President is Too Il to Handle the Job"). On the national
level it is well-settled law that the judiciary will not grant writs of mandamus to compel
executive officials to act, particularly where their duties are discretionary. Panama Canal Co.
v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958) (remedy restricted mainly to situations where
ministerial duties of a nondiscretionary nature are involved); see Whitehouse v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 349 U.S. 366, 373 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.) ("[M]andamus is . . . governed by
equitable considerations and is to be granted only in the exercise of sound discretion.');
Black v. Boyd, 251 F.2d 843, 844 (6th Cir. 1958) (mandamus not available to direct action
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General disagreement manifested itself during the hearings on the
procedure for determining the existence and termination of an in-
ability. 0 9 Proposals were advanced giving the decisive role variously to
the Vice-President, the Cabinet, Congress, the Supreme Court or an
Inability Commission. Each had, and still has, its adherents and critics.
These proposals are now briefly considered.
A. Vice-President
The understanding reached between President Eisenhower and Vice-
President Nixon in 1958 gave a decisive role to the Vice-President. 210
It allowed him to decide the question of inability "after such consulta-
tion as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances." If able to
do so, the President could inform the Vice-President of his inability. In
either case, only "powers and duties" would devolve and the President
would determine when his inability had ended.211
In an Attorney General's opinion dated August 2, 1961, Robert F.
Kennedy expressed the view, as had the Eisenhower Administration,
that the Constitution permits the Vice-President to raise and decide the
question of inability and that merely the powers and duties of the
office devolve on him until the President recovers.212 The time of
in a specific way); Clackamas County, Ore. v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479, 488-91 & nn.27-35
(D.C. Cir. 1954) (Prettyman, C.J.) (contains a comprehensive listing of authorities), judg-
ment vacated, 349 U.S. 909, rehearing denied, 349 U.S. 934 (1955); M.P. & St. L. Express,
Inc. v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Ky. 1958) (can not compel a ruling in a partic-
ular way). "Discretion is always subject to abuse, but the framers of our Constitution have
indicated their conviction that the danger of abuse by the executive is a lesser evil than to
render the acts left to executive control subject to judicial encroachment." Goldberg v.
Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1955),. Mandamus will be granted to protect vested
legal rights and to enforce fixed legal duties. Ibid.
209. For views as to who should initiate the question of inability, see 1957 Analysis 11-20,
and as to who should resolve the question once raised, see id. at 20-33.
210. White House Press Release, March 3, 1958; see Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States, 1958, at 188-89 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1959). See generally Nixon,
Six Crises 178-80 (1962).
211. In explaining the approach of his Administration, President Eisenhower stated:
"[In] the first case we covered: the President himself knows, let's say, he is going into a
hospital for a very dangerous operation of some kind, and he may be out for seven days or
eight days, where he can't even communicate with anyone. He says, 'All right, I am tem-
porarily disabled,' and it is provided for that way."
"There could be a case where a man has a stroke that was slight, from which he
would recover. We have great statesmen in the world today that recovered from a couple of
them and carried on for years. But he wouldn't be able to say 'I am incapable of acting,'
because he would be unconscious." Public Papers of the President of the United States, 1957,
at 245 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1958).
212. 42 Ops. Att'y Gen. No. 5 (1961).
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recovery, the Attorney General stated, was a matter for the President
to determine.
The occasion for the opinion of the Attorney General was the agree-
ment reached between President Kennedy and Vice-President Johnson,
adopting, in substance, the agreement that had existed between President
Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon. 13 "Cumulative precedents of
this kind may be valuable in the future," the Attorney General said,
and they are "clearly constitutional and as close to spelling out a practical
solution to the problem as is possible.
'214
Representative Emanuel Celler of New York, -15 who conducted
extensive hearings on the question in 1956, is in favor of a constitutional
amendment216 or joint resolution217 under which the Vice-President, if
satisfied of the President's inability, would convene both Houses of
Congress and announce that the powers and duties have devolved.
The President would resume such powers and duties upon his declaration
of recovery.
Others concurring in an approach which would give authority to the
Vice-President included Professor C. Herman Pritchett -1 8 of the Univer-
sity of Chicago, Professor Roger P. Peters2 19 of the University of Notre
Dame, Thomas K. Finletter,22 0 Sidney Hyman ' and John H. Romani." '
B. Cabinet
The principal supporters of Cabinet authority in the decision are
former members of the executive branch. President Herbert Hoover
favors a commission of between seven and fifteen heads of executive
departments or agencies, for the reason that "a President's inability...
should be determined by the . . . [political] party having the respon-
sibilities determined by the election. '2 2  Former Attorney General
Herbert Brownell, Jr. offered this proposal on behalf of the Eisenhower
Administration: The President could declare his inability in writing,- 4
213. White House Press Release, August 10, 1961; see Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States, 1961, at 561-62 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1962).
214. 42 Ops. Att'y Gen. No. 5, at 26-27 (1961).
215. See U.S. News & World Rep., June 15, 1956, p. 71 (summary of views).
216. H.R.J. Res. 33, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
217. H.R.J. Res. 35, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
218. 1956 House Hearings 71-72.
219. Id. at 122-23 (emphasis on insanity).
220. 1958 Senate Hearings 240-41.
221. 1956 House Hearings 54; Hyman, The Issue of Presidential Disability, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 26, 1956, § 6 (magazine), p. 13.
222. 1956 House Hearings 42-43.
223. 1958 Senate Hearings 10-11; see 1956 House Hearings 1-2.
224. The writing, former Attorney General William P. Rogers later said, "would be filed
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whereupon the Vice-President would discharge the powers and duties
of the office. If the President failed or was unable to declare his own
inability, the Vice-President, "if satisfied of the President's inability,
and upon approval in writing of a majority of the heads of executive
departments who are members of the President's Cabinet, 228 would
act as President. The President would resume his powers and duties
upon his declaration of recovery in writing. Under the Brownell approach,
the question of inability could be raised by either the Vice-President
or a majority of the Cabinet.
Senator Keating of New York (then a member of the House of
Representatives) saw this danger in the Brownell approach:
[It strikes me that danger is inherent in this proposal which leaves it to the Vice
President and Cabinet. If the Vice President and the Cabinet decided to gang up
on the President, they might say, "He is unable," and then the next day, under
your proposal, he could say, "I am able to act," and unless he fired the members
of the Cabinet, they would then the next day say he was unable.220
In answering Senator Keating's objection, Brownell said that public
opinion would decide the matter in the "ultimate analysis." The Vice-
President, said Brownell, would not act without the support of the
Nation and could not act without majority approval of the Cabinet.
Since the President is elected by the people, Brownell felt that the people
would want no obstructions to his resuming the powers and duties of
the Presidency. But, if he acted irresponsibly, impeachment would be
an available remedy.227
One year later, the Brownell approach was modified by the Eisen-
hower Administration to cover the case where a President asserts his
ability to perform when he is not able to do so. 228 Upon such a con-
tingency, the Vice-President, with the approval of a majority of the
Cabinet, could bring the matter before Congress, which would conduct
an inability proceeding in accordance with procedures provided for
impeachment.2 9 If a majority of the House voted that the inability
had not terminated and the Senate concurred by a two-thirds vote of
with the Secretary of State, as other state documents are filed." 1958 Senate Hearings 170.
See note 9 supra.
225. See the excellent testimony of former Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr. before
the Celler Committee in 1957. 1957 House Hearing 4-32; see also N.Y. Times, April 2, 1957,
p. 21, cols. 1-8 (excerpts therefrom). See note 271 infra.
226. 1957 House Hearing 29.
227. Id. at 29-30. The House impeaches (U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5), and the Senate
tries, presided over by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6).
228. See the excellent testimony of former Attorney General William P. Rogers before
the Kefauver Committee in 1958. 1958 Senate Hearings 147-85.
229. Id. at 155-56 (Rogers).
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those present, the Vice-President would discharge the powers and duties
for the remainder of the term or until a majority of both Houses decided
that the inability had ended. This procedure would eliminate the stigma
and permanent effect of an impeachment proceeding. 3
C. Congress
Many of the proposals for participation by Congress involve a
general grant of power. Typical is the approach of the New York
State Bar Association," 1 the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York,232 and the American Bar Association.' All suggest a constitu-
tional amendment, containing the following provision:
230. Professor Edgar Waugh of Eastern Michigan College would qualify Rogers' proposal
by permitting Congress to make a conclusive determination of inability upon majority
vote. Such a determination could only be made if two thirds of each House had found that
a crisis had arisen and that a prompt determination could not be made without Congress'
intervention. 1958 Senate Hearings 136-40.
Representative John V. Lindsay of New York (H.R.J. Res. 272, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1963); same, H.R.J. Res. 529, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)) and former Senator Estes
Kefauver of Tennessee (S.J. Res. 28, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ; same, S.J. Res. 19, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)) would also have the Vice-President act, upon the written approval
of a majority of the heads of the executive departments. The President would not resume
his responsibilities until the seventh day after his public announcement of recovery (unless
both he and the Vice-President agreed on an earlier date). In the interim the Vice-
President, with written approval of a majority of the heads of the executive departments,
could question his recovery by having Congress consider the issue. If a concurrent resolution
passed each House by a two-thirds vote of the members present declaring that the disability
had not ended, the Vice-President would then discharge the powers and duties until (1) he
believed the President to be able, or (2) a majority of the members pr'esent in each House so
declared by concurrent resolution, or (3) the President's term ended.
231. See Proceedings of 82nd Annual Meeting and Committee Reports for 1958, N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n 104-08 (1959).
232. See Comm. on Fed. Legislation of N.Y.C.B.A., A Report on the Problem of Pred-
dential Inability, 17 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 185 (1962). The Committee's report %as
approved by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on May 8, 1962. Id. at 282.
233. A.B.A. Rep. 129-30 (1960); See 1963 Senate Hearings 13-18. Also in accord are
S.J. Res. 35, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (Senators Keating and Kefauver); H.R.J. Res.
77, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (Representative Charles E. Bennett of Florida); same,
H.R.J. Res. 7, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R.J. Res. 210 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963)
(Representative Howard W. Robison of New York); same, H.R.J. Res. 223, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. The present Administration also seems to be behind such a proposal. 1963 Senate
Hearings 32-41 (remarks of Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach). Professor
Richard H. Hansen of the University of Nebraska would add to the proposal that any
"procedure must be compatible with the maintenance of the three distinct departments of
government . . . and the preservation of the checks and balances between the coordinate
branches." See Hansen, The Year We Had No President 117-18 (1962) and S.J. Res. 84,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), and the criticism thereof in 1963 Senate Hearings 36.
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The commencement and termination of any inability shall be determined by such
method as Congress shall by law provide.
Former Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney of Wyoming favored a con-
stitutional amendment which would give Congress the power to declare
by concurrent resolution the existence and termination of an inability." 4
Professor DeW. Howe of Harvard Law School urged Congress to declare
by statute or joint resolution its jurisdiction over inability cases.' "
Professor Charles Aikin of the University of California suggested that
Congress pass a joint resolution which would permit it to act by con-
current resolution on questions of inability.
280
Representative Abraham J. Multer of New York has introduced a
bill in Congress 2 7 calling for a statute which would operate as follows:
The Senate would determine the question of inability after being
requested to do so by a majority of the House of Representatives.2 88
If two thirds of the Senate reached the conclusion that the President was
disabled, the same two thirds would then have to direct the Vice-
President to act as President.28 The question of termination would be
handled in the same manner. 40
D. Supreme Court
Senator J. W. Fulbright 241 of Arkansas and Representative Peter
Frelinghuysen, Jr.2 42 of New Jersey suggest constitutional amendments
along these lines: Congress, by a concurrent resolution approved by a
two-thirds vote of each house, may suggest that the President is unable
to discharge his powers and duties. Thereupon the Supreme Court shall
determine whether or not the President is able to discharge such powers
and duties.243 If he is found disabled, he can not resume his powers and
duties until the Court determines that he is able.
234. 1958 Senate Hearings 24; see note 206 supra.
235. "I believe that the Congress possesses today the sole power which it seems to me to be
desirable for it to exercise. That is the power to assert an exclusive authority over the matter
of a President's inability." 1958 Senate Hearings 219.
236. 1956 House Hearings 121.
237. H.R. 707, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ; same, H.R. 513, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
238. H.R. 707, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-2 (1963). The Chief justice of the Supreme
Court would convene the Senate, upon receipt of a resolution from the House.
239. H.R. 707, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1963).
240. H.R. 707, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1963). A majority of the members of either
House of Congress might request the Chief Justice to convene a special session of the Senate.
241. 1958 Senate Hearings 39-40; S.J. Res. 100, 25th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
242. 1956 House Hearings 37. See Frelinghuysen, Presidential Disability, Annals 144-55
(1956).




Professor William W. Crosskey has been singular in his insistence
that the Constitution provides a method for determining presidential
inability cases in the judicial article.24 He reasons that such cases involve
the meaning and application of the Constitution and, therefore, fall
within the clause "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution .... ,,211 At the time of the Constitution, he says, quo
warranto proceedings, i.e., cases involving the right of an individual to
a public office, were not unusual. Consequently, the Founding Fathers
intended inability questions to be determined in quo warranto pro-
ceedings.248 Professor Crosskey suggests that a statute could give the
Vice-President the right to initiate such proceedings when inability is in
issue and the President the right when recovery is in issue.2 47
E. Inability Commission
An impressive array of authorities urged the formation of an Inability
Commission to decide questions of presidential inability. Former Presi-
dent Harry S. Truman suggested a commission of seven, consisting of the
Vice-President, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Speaker of the
House, and the majority and minority leaders of both the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Senate.2 48 The commission would be empowered to
244. See note 53 supra.
245. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cd. 1. See note 53 supra.
246. See Wallace v. Anderson, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 291 (1820), where the Court held
that quo warranto was not available to an individual. It could not be maintained, said the
Court, "except at the instance of the United States." Id. at 292. See generally Johnson v.
Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 502 (1933) (an "extraordinary proceeding"; an individual
needs a statutory right for it) ; Newman v. United States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 US. 537 (1915)
(good listing of authorities); Territory v. Lockwood, 70 US. (3 Wall.) 236 (1865) (a
territory had no right to test the right of a federal judge to his office). Under these authori-
ties only the Government can institute quo warranto proceedings against national officers.
For state decisions, see State ex rel. Jewett v. Satti, 133 Conn. 687, 54 A.2d 272 (1947) (quo
warranto available to state to determine the right of a state official to his office); State ex
rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 ND. 68, 256 N.W. 377 (1934) (quo warranto does not invade state
legislative power of impeachment).
It is very likely that the Supreme Court would say that questions of presidential inability
are political in nature and do not admit of the exercise of the judicial power. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (the validity of a state's ratification of a constitu-
tional amendment is for Congress to determine and not the courts) ; Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923) (taxpayer not permitted to attack a congressional appropriation
measure); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861) (to coerce a Governor to
surrender a fugitive is political); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (the mean-
ing of "republican form of government" is for the President and Congress to determine).
247. 1958 Senate Hearings 237.
248. Id. at 12. The "Committee of Seven" would be empowered to call a special session
of Congress if it were in recess. "Should the stricken President, thus relieved, experience
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select a group of medical authorities from the top medical schools in the
country. If they found the President "truly incapacitated," the com-
mission would so inform Congress and if Congress agreed by a two-thirds
vote of its membership, the Vice-President would become President for
the remainder of the term.
Arthur Krock of the New York Times strongly favored a different
type of commission. 29 The Vice-President and Chief Justice would be
excluded. Its membership would consist of members of the Cabinet and
legislative leaders of both parties. His so-called "Inability Council" would
operate as follows: Any two members who were not of the President's
party might request a meeting of the Council by filing a notice with
the Secretary of State, who would convene the body. If a majority
believed that a question of inability existed, the Surgeon General of the
United States250 would appoint five members of the medical profession
from the staffs of voluntary hospitals to investigate and report back
to the Council. If a majority of the Council believed the President
to be disabled, the Vice-President would discharge the powers and
duties of the Presidency. The same procedure would be followed in
the President's resumption of such powers and duties. In either event,
Mr. Krock suggests that the entire process should be required to be
completed within a specified period of time, e.g., thirty days.25'
Professor Arthur E. Sutherland of Harvard Law School suggests a
commission consisting of the Chief Justice, who would have a vote in
cases of a tie, the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense, the At-
torney General and the majority leaders of the two major parties in
Congress.252 Professor James Hart of the University of Virginia, on
the other hand, leaned toward a commission of between three and
five members who would be appointed by the Supreme Court of the
United States. The members would be well-respected private citizens
in active life, and would remain on the commission until retirement,
election to a public office, or removal for cause.253 Similarly, Profes-
sor Arnold J. Lien of Washington University favored a commission
of five or seven members appointed by the Supreme Court for long or
during his term a complete recovery, he would not be entitled to repossess the office."
Id. at 13.
249. 1956 House Hearings 62-63.
250. 58 Stat. 684 (1944), 42 U.S.C. § 205 (1958).
251. 1956 House Hearings 63.
252. 1958 Senate Hearings 205. Professor Sutherland would have the Commission assem-
ble on the call of any two members, and the President or any two members could convene
the body in order to have a determination as to recovery. Ibid.
253. 1956 House Hearings 97; see 1958 Senate Hearings 238-39. The Commission would
determine the commencement and termination of an inability. Ibid.
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staggered terms. It would have authority to employ specialists. -
Decisions of the commission would be reviewable by either Congress
or the Supreme Court on the petition of the President. Former Senator
Frederick G. Payne of Maine preferred a commission of the Chief
Justice, who would have a nonvoting role, legislative leaders of both
parties, and several members of the Cabinet. The Vice-President would
have the right to ask for a decision if he felt there was a question of
presidential inability. 25 Justice Michael A. Musmanno of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court inclined toward a commission of the Senate and
House Committees on the Judiciary.2 5
Other suggestions for inability commissions have been made by
Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York-,2 7 Senator J. Sparkman
of Alabama,258 Henry Fowler,25 9 former Vice-President Henry Wal-
254. 1956 House Hearings 123.
255. 1958 Senate Hearings 37-38, modifying views expressed at 1956 House Hearings 16.
256. 1958 Senate Hearings 71-72.
257. He favors a commission of the Vice-President (who would act as chairman and
have a nonvoting role), the Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representa-
tives, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Treasury, and the Attorney General. S.J. Res. 125, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4 (1961).
Five members would constitute a quorum and the concurrence in writing of five would be
necessary for any action. The commission would be convened by the chairman on the
request of any three members who stated, in writing, that they had sufficient cause to
believe that the President was disabled. It would determine the commencement and ter-
mination of inability. S.J. Res. 125, 87th Cong., 1st Sess §§ 5, 7 (1961). Under the proposal
of Senator Keating, the President would be able to notify the commission as to his re-
covery, but the commission would have to meet, seek medical advice and decide whether
he had recovered. S.J. Res. 125, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1961). For previous proposals
of Senator Keating, see H.R. 6510, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); H.R.J. Res. 334, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1957). In these proposals the Chief Justice and the Senior Associate Justice were
members of the commission.
Representative William S. Curtin of Pennsylvania has introduced a proposal calling for
a "President Inability Commission" composed of the Chief Justice (who would have a
voting role only in case of a tie), the Senior Associate Justice, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Treasury, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the minority
and majority leaders of the Senate. H.R.J. Res. 28, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1963); same,
H.R.J. Res. 97, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1961). Five members would be necessary for a
quorum and the written concurrence of five for any action. The chairman would convene
the commission on the written request of any two members. When a determination were
reached, Congress would have to be notified, as well as the President and Vice-President.
H.R.J. Res. 28, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5, 7 (1963). Then, the powers and duties would de-
volve. Unlike the Keating approach, the process for determining whether the President had
recovered could be started only on the written request of two members. H.R.J. Res. 28, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1963).
258. He prefers a group of men, not "so large as to be unwieldly," functioning under an
"extraordinary majority ruling" requirement. 1956 House Hearings 11. He would also favor
Supreme Court participation on the commission. Id. at 11-12.
259. 1958 Senate Hearings 114. His "Inability Advisory Council" would consist of those
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lace,2 60 Professors David Fellman of the University of Wisconsin 20 ' and
Joseph E. Kallenbach of the University of Michigan, 2  and Repre-
sentative Louis Wyman of New Hampshire. 3
V. CONCLUSION
The manifold problem of presidential inability has now receded
from the general congressional and public consciousness and, very likely,
will not return until another President should become disabled. The
confusion persists. It is indeed sad that no Congress has succeeded
in solving the problem in all the years since it first presented itself.
In 1787, a group of men drafted, in four short months, a several thousand
word Constitution of the United States which has endured for almost two
centuries with only a few changes. The framers thought they had handled
the question of executive succession adequately by providing for a
substitute who would exercise the powers and duties of the Presidency
in cases of death, resignation, removal or inability of the President. A
Committee of Style and John Tyler changed all that.
A solution to this problem has been long delayed because of the
difficulty in ascertaining what the Constitution means and in finding
a solution which would be generally acceptable and which would cover
all the situations that could possibly arise. Most of the proposed solutions
have some very basic defects.
Those proposals which would give Congress a power of determin-
ing or of establishing a procedure for determining the commencement
and termination of inability are objectionable principally because to
place such power in the hands of Congress could, as former Attorney
General Herbert Brownell, Jr. stated, amount to "a major shift in the
checks and balances among the three divisions of the federal govern-
ment. .. .""' They would give Congress a new power over the Presi-
appointed by Congress for succession purposes. See note 2 supra. It would function much
like the plan of Arthur Krock. See notes 249-51 supra and accompanying text. He would per-
mit the President to resume the powers and duties of the office without waiting for a Com-
mittee determination. Id. at 115.
260. It was reported that he favored a commission of the Cabinet, Supreme Court
Justices, and members of Congress. 1956 House Hearings 11.
261. He suggests a small commission of people from the President's party. It would be
subject to majority vote and have among its members the Chief Justice and an Associate
Justice. For his views see 1958 Senate Hearings 212-18, where he expressed a preference for
the British type of commission. See notes 174-76 supra and accompanying text.
262. 1958 Senate Hearings 206-08. Compare with 1957 House Hearing 26 (remarks
of former Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr.); 1956 House Hearings 50-51 (remarks
of Sidney Hyman), 98 (remarks of Professor James Hart).
263. For his commission, see H.R. 1164, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1963).
264. Brownell, Presidential Disability: The Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 68
Yale L.J. 189, 199 (1958).
[Vol. 32
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
dent-one which it does not now possess and which it was never
intended to possess. Further, as a forum for partisan politics, Congress
could conceivably wield such a power for political purposes. As for
Congress itself deciding questions of presidential inability, hearings,
discussions, debates, filibusters and other familiar tactics could unduly
delay a decision and perhaps even make one a practical impossibility.6
Also, if Congress were in recess, who would have the authority to con-
vene a special session if the President should become disabled? Finally,
merely to give Congress a broad power to establish a method for
determining the beginning and ending of inability is, in itself, no solu-
tion, for a method would stili have to be agreed upon by Congress-
and that could take years. Surely the Founding Fathers would never
have sanctioned such a broad power in the hands of Congress. They
were careful to provide only one way for a President to be deprived
of the prerogatives of his office, i.e., impeachment, and were quite specific
about how this would work. Since a determination of inability would
also deprive a President of his prerogatives-at least temporarily-the
method of determining the same should be no less specific and should
be written into the Constitution itself.
Participation by the Supreme Court in inability cases is objectionable,
too, as violative of the principle of separation of powers. -200 Moreover,
the Court's processes are time-consuming while it is conceivable that
circumstances might necessitate an immediate decision. And, of course,
265. In the election of 1874, Samuel J. Tilden won a plurality of the popular vote and
one short of a majority in the Electoral College. Some votes were in doubt so that an
Electoral Commission was created. Its membership consisted of five Senators, five Represen-
tatives and five Supreme Court justices. Three Senators and two Representatives were Re-
publican, while two Senators and three Representatives were Democrats. Two Justices
were Republicans and two were Democrats. The four selected a fifth Justice, who was a
Republican. Thus the Commission consisted of eight Republicans and seven Democrats.
Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican candidate, became President by a strict party vote of
eight to seven. See O'Neil, The American Electoral System 193-234 (1887). The special
commission was dissolved shortly thereafter and an act was passed to handle any future
controversies. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). See J. Mathews, The American Constitutional System
136 (1940 ed.), where the author stated that the "special electoral commission was entirely
extraconstitutional and Congress possibly exceeded its authority in creating it."
Politics were not absent from the presidential elections of 1800 and 1824, when the House
of Representatives chose the President. See O'Nel, supra at 68-90, for a good discussion of
the election of 1800. See generally MacLean, President and Congress: The Conflict of
Powers (1955); Pepper, Family Quarrels, The President, The Senate, and the House (1931).
266. See 1958 Senate Hearings 193-94 (remarks of Charles S. Rhyne); 1957 House
Hearing 25 (remarks of Herbert Brownell, Jr.); 1956 House Hearings 51 (remarks of




such participation would require changing the judicial article of the
Constitution which would, no doubt, involve other problems.
The establishment of an inability commission having authority to
make the determination of inability is objectionable..2 7 To place such
momentous and absolute power over the President of the United States
in the hands of a commission whose members might not even be elected
by the people would be contrary to the principles underlying our form
of government. To place such power in the hands of a Medical Com-
mission would be absurd because inability is much more than a medical
question. To place such power in the hands of any kind of board
or commission would amount to a serious curtailment of the independence
of the Presidency, as would a requirement that the President of the
United States submit himself to physical examinations periodically or
at the whim of a board or commission. As former Attorney General
Brownell, Jr. stated:
[I]t seemed unwise to us [the Eisenhower administration] to establish formal legal
machinery for giving a President physical and mental examinations because this
amounts to placing a President constantly on trial as to his health and this would
give a hostile commission the power to harass him at all times. 208
And it is doubtful that a commission could act swiftly enough should
the occasion require such action.
Participation by Supreme Court Justices on an Inability Commission
is also objectionable. The Supreme Court itself is against it. In a letter
to Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York, Chief Justice Earl Warren
had this to say:
It has been the belief of all of us that because of the separation of powers in our
Government, the nature of the judicial process, the possibility of a controversy of
this character coming to the Court, and the danger of disqualification which might
result in lack of a quorum, it would be inadvisable for any member of the Court
to serve on such a Commission. 20 9
Giving final or near final authority over inability decision to the
Cabinet (or the heads of the executive departments) is not without
objection.Y In the first place, the Cabinet is not an elected body. 71
267. See 1958 Senate Hearings 133 (remarks of Professor Edgar Waugh), 166 (remarks
of former Attorney General William P. Rogers), 193 (remarks of Charles S. Rhyne); 1957
House Hearing 26-27 (remarks of Herbert Brownell, Jr.); 1956 House Hearings 122 (remarks
of Professor Roger P. Peters).
268. 1957 House Hearing 26.
269. 1958 Senate Hearings 14.
270. See 1958 Senate Hearings 19 (remarks of Senator Joseph C. OMahoney), 219
(remarks of Professor Mark DeW. Howe); 1957 House Hearing 36 (remarks of Martin
Taylor); 1956 House Hearings 50 (remarks of Sidney Hyman), 61-62 (remarks of
Arthur Krock), 116 (remarks of Professor William W. Crosskey).
271. A Cabinet was rejected at the Convention as a mechanism of assisting the President.
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To place such power in its hands, moreover, could possibly result in a
regency of the Cabinet. And the Cabinet members, owing either to
personal loyalty to the President or fear of losing their positions,2 -7 2
might be too hesitant to find the President disabled, Yet, as a matter of
historical fact, the Garfield and Wilson Cabinets actually urged the
respective Vice-Presidents to act as President.
The crisis which presently exists could be resolved most simply by
the enactment of a constitutional amendment which would: (1) give
constitutional status to the Tyler precedent, i.e., amend the succession
clause to read that in cases of death, resignation and removal, the Vice-
President becomes President for the remainder of the term ;27  (2)
eliminate the ambiguous wording of the succession clause so as to make
it indisputably clear that the Vice-President merely acts as President
for the period of any inability. -2 74 A constitutional amendment is essen-
1 Farrand 1, 70, 97, 110; 2 id. at 285, 328, 335-37, 367, 537-42. However, U.S. Const. art.
II, § 2, cl. 1 provides that the President "may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the
Duties of their respective Ofices.. . ." At present, there are ten executive departments. 70
Stat. 732 (1956), 5 U.S.C. § 1 (1958) ; see note 2 supra. Beginning with President Washing-
ton, each President has had a Cabinet, composed usually of the heads of the executive
departments. The custom of the Vice-President's participating in Cabinet meetings was
started by President Washington, then dropped, and later revived during the administration
of President Harding. Since the composition of the Cabinet is at the discretion of the
President, most proposals refer to the heads of the executive departments in order
to remove all doubt on the point.
272. Executive officers may be removed at will by the President, Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926), although the heads of the so-called independent regulatory agencies
are removable only for cause where the statute so provides, Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) ; cf. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). By virtue of
this power, a disabled President is in a position to influence a Cabinet decision.
273. The Vice-President, in these situations, should take the presidential oath of office,
though his succession should be effective as of the time of death, resignation or removal.
Moreover, his salary, instead of $35,000 (see 3 U.S.C. § 104 (1958)), should be that of a
President, i.e., $100,000, plus a $50,000 expense allowance (3 U.S.C. § 102 (1958)), plus a
maximum of $40,000 for traveling expenses (3 U.S.C. § 103 (1958)).
274. The expression "inability" should be left intact as it can cover an almost unlimited
number of situations. See note 201 supra. To distinguish between temporary and per-
manent inability, as some suggest, would create unnecessary problems-for example, as to
what is temporary or permanent. The times would have a lot to do with whether the Vice-
President should act.
In order to be consistent with the constitutional result of exercising the powers and
duties, the Vice-President should not take the presidential oath or receive the President's
salafy in cases of inability (though there would be no serious objection to his receiving
the President's salary). He would merely be discharging a power of his office. It would be
advisable, however, to make an expense allowance available to the Vice-President when
he acts as President (see note 273 supra). This could be effected by changing the present
statute relating to the Vice-President's salary. 3 U.S.C. § 104 (1958). See generally, Walls v.
1963]
124 FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
tial, as any lesser means of solving the problem would be open to
constitutional attack, which would come most likely during a time
of inability-when we least could afford it.
With this clarification of the succession clause no one disagrees.
Yet, it is precisely this clarification which is needed. It was the ambiguous
wording of the Constitution that restrained Vice-Presidents Arthur and
Marshall from acting as President and that made President Wilson
suspicious of Lansing and Marshall. If the Constitution were clarified in
this regard, without more, it is suggested that the inability problem would
be solved for all practical purposes. If the Constitution had been clear
in 1881 and 1919, history very probably would have been different. Most
certainly, if the Constitution had been clear in 1955 and it had been
necessary for the Vice-President to act as President, he would have acted
and he would have done so with the President's approval.
An amendment embracing only these changes would not be so in-
adequate a solution as some may think. Many systems operate
smoothly and effectively under a simple type of succession provision
which leaves the question of inability to the entities and individuals con-
cerned. Such a succession provision is to be found in most of the states,"'
Hall, 202 Ark. 999, 154 S.W.2d 573 (1941), where the president pro tempore of the state
senate did not have to take the oath when acting for the governor during his absence from
the state. Accord, Opinion of Justices, 70 Me. 560, 593-94 (1880). Compare, In re An Act
Concerning Alcoholic Beverages, 130 N.J.L. 123, 31 A.2d 837 (1943) (oath taken); State
ex rel. Chatterton v. Grant, 12 Wyo. 1, 73 Pac. 470 (1903) (received pay of both offices).
The constitutions of several states provide that whenever the successor acts as governor,
he is to receive the same salary as the governor. E.g., Ala. Const. art. V, § 129; Ky.
Const. § 86; La. Const. art. V, § 7; Mich. Const. art. V, § 27. A more logical result occurs
in one state where the successor does not receive the governor's salary in cases of tempo-
rary absence or disability. Utah Const. art. 7, § 11. A number of state constitutions have
no specific provision in point. Still others provide for the devolution of the emoluments of
the office, along with the powers and duties, for the period of disability or until the end
of the term (or until a new governor is elected). E.g., Colo. Const. art. IV, § 13; Idaho
Const. art. IV, § 12; Ill. Const. art. V, § 17; Mo. Const. art IV, § 11; Neb. Const. art.
IV, § 16; N.M. Coast. art. V, § 7; N.C. Const. art. III, § 12; Okla. Const. art. VI, § 16;
Pa. Const. art. IV, § 13.
275. At present, a time of inability leaves the President with little leverage. Thus the
President may not delegate any of his constitutional functions even to the Vice-President.
There are numerous matters which require a President's attention. Bills may be approved
or disapproved only by the President. The President, however, can delegate some of his
statutory duties. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1958). See generally Nobleman, The Delegation of
Presidential Functions: Constitutional and Legal Aspect, Annals 134 (1956); 1 Truman,
Memoirs 195-98 (1955).
276. N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 5, is representative: "In case of the impeachment of the
governor, or his removal from office, death, inability to discharge the powers and duties
of the office, resignation, or absence from the state, the powers and duties of the office
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
many foreign countries, the federal judicial system2"' and the executive
department. 278
Although such an amendment would not explicitly answer the question
of who determines the commencement and termination of inability, that
power would rest where it now is and where it belongs-in the executive
branch.279 The wisdom of the framers is legendary. They wrote a Con-
stitution embodying a philosophy of government whereby powers were
separately distributed among the legislative, executive and judicial
branches. This separation of powers was made subject to specified checks
and balances. No others were intended, nor should any others now be
written into the Constitution. To give authority in a determination of
presidential inability to any branch other than the executive branch
would be unconstitutional without an amendment. To do so by an
amendment would result in a redistribution of power among the three
branches and would be a violation, in spirit, of the principle of separation
of powers. To give such authority to a nonelected body would be a
violation of the democratic process.
shall devolve upon the lieutenant-governor for the residue of the term, or until the disa-
bility shall cease."
277. The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court is covered by the following
provision: "Whenever the Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties of his office or the
office is vacant, his powers and duties shall devolve upon the associate justice next in
precedence who is able to act, until such disability is removed or another Chief Justice
is appointed and duly qualified." 28 U.S.C. § 3 (1958). The Chief Judges of the Circuit
Courts of Appeals (28 U.S.C. § 45(d) (1958)), District Courts (28 U.S.C. § 136(d) (1958)),
and Custom Court (28 U.S.C. § 253 (1958)) are covered by this provision: "If he (a chief
judge] is temporarily unable to perform his duties as such, they shall be performed by the
judge in active service, . . . present, able and qualified to act, and next in precedence."
278. Rev. Stat. 177 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 4 (1958): "In case of the death, resignation,
absence or sickness of the head of any department, the first or sole assistant thereof . . .
performs the duties of such head until a successor is appointed, or such absence or sickness
shall cease." See Rev. Stat. 178-79, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5-6 (1958).
279. A frequent objection to a constitutional amendment is that it would take
too long to be enacted. The record shows that the lengths of time from proposal to
ratification of the twenty-three amendments were as follows: (a) 1-10: 26 mos.; (b) 11:
11 mos.; (c) 12: 6 mos.; (d) 13: 10 mos.; (e) 14: 25 mos.; (f) 15: 11 mos.; (g) 16:
43 mos.; (h) 17: 11 mos.; (i) 18: 13 mos.; (j) 19: 14 1/2 mos.; (k) 20: 11 mos.; (1)
21: 9 1/2 mos.; (m) 22: 47 mos.; (n) 23: 9 1/2 mos. (The ratification date is important as to
when an amendment becomes effective. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).) See The
Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation 39-54 (Corwin
ed. 1953), for an excellent history of each amendment. It is elementary that the Constitu-
tion sets forth two ways to propose amendments: (1) by two-thirds vote in both Houses
of Congress, or (2) by a national constitutional convention called by Congress on the
request of two thirds of the state legislatures-and two ways to ratify them: (1) by the
legislatures in three fourths of the states, or (2) by conventions in three fourths of the




As the Constitution is now written, it is the Vice-President's duty to
act as President in cases of inability and therefore, by implication, his
duty to make the determination of inability.280 There is no major reason
why the President should not be able to declare his own inability. The
amendment should so provide. If the President were to use this power
in order to shirk his duties, he would be subject to impeachment on
the basis of neglect. The amendment should also provide that the
President is to be the judge in all cases as to when the inability has
ended, whereupon he immediately resumes his powers and duties. The
nature of the Presidency dictates that the President should not be
deprived of them against his will except by impeachment.
A requirement in any amendment that when the President is unable or
does not make the determination of inability the Vice-President can act
only with majority approval of the Cabinet is not advisable for reasons
previously given28' and for the additional reason that there might be situa-
tions requiring action by the Vice-President independently of Cabinet
approval or before such approval would be possible.282 However, a clause
to the effect that "in reaching his determination, the Vice-President may
secure the opinions of the Heads of the Executive Departments" is ad-
visable, though he would probably do so anyway. It would serve as a
constitutional recommendation that the Vice-President consult the
Cabinet, while not preventing him from making the determination alone,
should it be necessary. With Cabinet support, however, he would be less
reluctant to act in a proper case and his decision would meet with
greater public acceptance.
An amendment along the lines above might well foster an attitude of
cooperation between the President and Vice-President in inability situa-
tions. It would not only permit but encourage the President to make a
determination of his own inability, without fear of losing his office, in
280. Herbert Brownell, Jr. has persuasively argued this point, saying that contingent
grants of power give the grantee the right to determine when to exercise it. 1957 House
Hearing 21; see Brownell, supra note 264, at 205. The cases frequently cited for this
proposition are J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (President
given authority to fix rate of custom duties on imports); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
(1892) (President given authority to suspend provisions of a tariff act); Martin v. Mott,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) (President given authority to call militia into service); and
Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 382 (1813) (President given power to
renew trade with certain countries). Martin Taylor, however, says that in each of the
above cases acts were done "in pursuance of express authority given the President by
Congress." 1957 House Hearing 36. He then adds that "this is an entirely different
matter from saying that power may be implied where express direction is not given." Ibid.
Taylor's objections are not convincing. See note 205 supra.
281. See notes 270-72 supra and accompanying text.
282. See note 271 supra and accompanying text.
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such cases as where he is actually sick or about to undergo an operation.
It would also allow the Vice-President to act without hesitation in cases
where the President is clearly unable to make the determination of
inability, e.g., where he is in a coma, kidnapped or a prisoner.
The case of insanity is not covered by the suggested amendment
since it is unlikely that the President would declare himself unable,
and it would be impossible or futile for the Vice-President to make a
determination of inability as the President would undoubtedly insist
that he was able-and his word would be final."s However, the Constitu-
tion provides a remedy for a situation where the President acts irrespon-
sibly or neglects or abuses the duties of his office, namely, impeachment. - '
This is the remedy for presidential insanity and there is evidence that
it would have been so intended by the Founding Fathers.8 It bears
repeating that the President is elected by all the people and therefore
should not be deprived of the powers and duties of his office against his
will except by the people at the polls or, in extraordinary cases, by Con-
gress under the impeachment provisions of the Constitution. Given the
case of an insane President, with the attendant danger to the Nation's
security, it is submitted that Congress could act to meet the crisis as
swiftly and effectively as any board or commission, if not more so.21
In order to provide for the occurrence of such a crisis during a recess of
Congress, there is little reason why the Vice-President should not be
283. For an interesting dramatization of a similar situation, see Wouk, The Caine
Mutiny (1951).
284. As President Eisenhower said at his press conference on April 3, 1957: "(B]ehind
this whole thing is the ability and the power in the Congress to impeach a President.
Presumably, if a President got in such shape that he was just acting wildly and uncon-
stitutionally, that would happen. That is the final protection of the people against a
President who is absolutely unable to discharge the functions of his office but doesn't
know it." Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1957, at 245 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office, 1958).
285. Significantly, at the Constitutional Convention James Madison spoke out in favor
of having impeachment in the Constitution because "he thought it indispensable that some
provision be made for defending the Community against the incapacity, negligence or perfidy
of the chief Magistrate... In the case of the Executive Magistracy which was to be admin-
istered by a single man, loss of capacity was more within the compass of probable events,
and either of them might be fatal to the Republic." 2 Farrand 65. And Gouverneur Morris
added: "Corrupting his electors, and incapacity, were other causes of impeachment. For the
latter he should be punished not as a man, but as an officer, and punished only by degrada-
tion from his office." 2 Farfand 69. See generally Foster, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States 505-630 (1895); At. Monthly, Jan. 1957, pp. 88-92 ("The Causes For
Which A President Can Be Impeached"). Compare, I Curtis, Constitutional History of the
United States 569 (1889 ed.) (inability not impeachable).
286. Witness: the declaration of war after the bombing of Pearl Harbor.
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given the power to convene a special session of Congress in such a case. 2 7
The writer's solution is, in most respects, not original.8 8 It is, however,
that which is most consistent with the intention of the Founding Fathers.
The President and Vice-President, the only public officials elected by all
the people, should have the opportunity to operate under a succession
provision free of the doubt that now exists. The provision should be
flexible, capable of working without the rigors of a legal proceeding or
the spectacle of a public show, and able to operate immediately if the
occasion should require it. 2 9 The author believes an amendment em-
bracing the following points would satisfy these tests:
1. In cases of death, resignation or removal the Vice-President becomes Presi-
dent for the remainder of the term.
2. In cases of inability, the Vice-President exercises the powers and duties of the
office for the duration of the inability.
3. The President may declare his own inability.
4. Where the President is unable to or does not declare his own inability, the
Vice-President may make the determination of inability.
5. In either 3 or 4 above, .the President can declare the cessation of the inability.
6. In making any determination, it is recommended that the Vice-President secure
the opinions of the Heads of the Executive Departments.
7. If an inability crisis should arise during a recess of Congress, the Vice-President
may convene an extraordinary session thereof.
The pressing problems of the day are those of civil rights, medical
care, the communist threat, aid to education, tax reform, and so on. Yet,
in a sense, does not the problem of presidential inability transcend them
all?290 Our strength and survival depend on our having an able leader
at the head of the executive branch at all times. The continuity of
the Executive should never be in doubt. At present it is. A constitutional
crisis exists. It is time that Congress act to resolve it once and for all.
287. This, of course, would entail a change in the Constitution, which gives such power
only to the President. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
288. Similar thoughts have been expressed by Brownell, op. cit. supra note 264, at
201-04; Davis, Inability of the President, S. Doc. No. 308, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1918). The
Eisenhower-Nixon and Kennedy-Johnson agreements are very much in point, though they
have no formal legal status.
289. As the New York Times wisely said: "The absolute necessity of avoiding any gap,
even momentarily, in the Executive power, or any doubt as to the possibility of Its
exercise, grows more imperative with each passing year. There could be times when the
safety of the nation depends on a decision being made instantly and accepted without
question." N.Y. Times, June 26, 1962, p. 32, cols. 3-4.
290. For general accounts of presidential responsibilities, see Coughlan, How to Ease
the Burdens of World's Most Burdensome Job, Life, Feb. 27, 1956, p. 125; U.S. News
& World Rep., March 14, 1958, p. 35 ("A Day in the Life of the President"); Id., Nov. 22,
1957, p. 50 ("The Presidency: Can Any One Man Do the Job?"); id., Feb. 3, 1956, p. 28
("A Work Week with Eisenhower").
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